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CaseNo.20100599-CA
IN THE
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Tamra Rhinehart,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.

State of Utah,
Respondent/Appellee.
Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Petitioner Tamra Rhinehart appeals the district court's dismissal of her postconviction petition. This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4103(2)0) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Issue I: Did the trial court plainly err by not giving Rhinehart notice that the State's
motion to dismiss would be converted into a summary judgment motion, where conversion
was required because Rhinehart had asked the court to consider matters outside the
pleadings?
Standard of Review: Rhinehart invited the alleged error, so there is no review for
plain error. See State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, If 9, 86 P.3d 742.
Issue II: Did the trial court erroneously dismiss Rhinehart's petition on summary
judgment, where Rhinehart did not proffer evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of
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material fact on any claim?
Standard ofReview. An appellate court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and
ultimate grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness, and views the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, If 6, 177 P.3d 600.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12 and 56 are included in Addendum A of this brief.
SUMMARY OF THE CASE
Underlying Crime
In July 2003, the body of Michael Boudrero was discovered in the basement of a
home under construction in North Logan. State v. Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^ 1, 3-9, 167
P.3d 1046 (Addendum B). He had been shot twice—once in the chest and once in the back.
Id. at Tf 1. Boudrero was Tamra Rhinehart's ex-husband. Id.
Police soon learned that Rhinehart had incurred substantial debt following her divorce
from Boudrero, and that for several months prior to the murder, Rhinehart had been trying to
secure a life insurance policy on Boudrero that named Rhinehart as the beneficiary. Id. at
Tf 5. Several insurance companies had rejected Rhinehart's attempts, but a "persistent Ms.
Rhinehart finally succeeded in purchasing a $50,000 life insurance policy for Mr. Boudrero
in April 2003 in which she listed herself as the beneficiary. Because the insurance company
required Mr. Boudrero's signature prior to issuance, Ms. Rhinehart forged it." Id.
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Police also obtained sworn statements from several people implicating Rhinehart in
the murder. These included her hairdresser (to whom she had confessed), her babysitter, and

Boudrero and claimed that he had done so at Rhinehart's request Id. at ^ 4-6.
Rhinehart pleads guilty to aggravated murder in exchange for the
State dropping its request for the death penalty
R hinehart was charged with one con: u it of aggi a\ ated mi lrder a capital felon} , c i: le
count of forgery, and four counts of communications fraud. Id. at % 7. In a separate
information, the State charged Rhinehart with one count of burglary, three counts of theft,
and one count of communications fraud. Id. "The burgia;.* ;;.:u ag^vau-u mi::..jr ... . -.
were ultimately severed, and Rhinehart was convicted in the burglary case, which proceeded
first." Id at f 8.
Several months after her conviction in the burglary case, Rhinehart accepted a plea
agreement that resolved the aggravated mi it der case, Rhinehart pleaded i;

,?

) T<

./. • • it

of aggravated murder. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining counts, as well
as "withdrawf ] its request to impose the death penalty." R, 116 [<hinehart further agreed to
serve a prison sentence "of either life without possibility of parole, or an indeterminate
prison term of not less than 20 years and which may be for life," to be determined by the
judge. Id.1

IHJ \r:A court conducted a complete rule 11 colloquy before accepting

-;*nvWtrf? nlea. See R 123-63 (transcript of plea hearing attached as Addendum D).

The plea agreement from the underlying criminal case is included in the postconviction record at R. 112-20, and it is attached as Addendum C to this brief.
3
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At sentencing, Rhinehart was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of
parole. See Addendum E (docket for criminal case 031100633 at *55-56). Mary Corporon
represented Rhinehart throughout the trial-level proceedings. See generally R. 3-29.
The supreme court rejects Rhinehart's direct appeal
Rhinehart appealed through new counsel, arguing that Corporon was ineffective
during the plea process, and that Corporon's "ineffectiveness... caused her to enter her plea
and to fail to bring a timely motion to withdraw it." Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^f 11. The
supreme court rejected her appeal, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction because of
Rhinehart's failure to timely move to withdraw her plea. Id. atfflf10-22.
Rhinehart9s post-conviction petition
Rhinehart filed a petition for post-conviction relief, again claiming that Corporon was
ineffective.

R. 3-29. Rhinehart alleged that Corporon was ineffective because she:

(1) recommended that Rhinehart plead guilty, even though some evidence purportedly
suggested that Rhinehart was innocent; (2) mistakenly advised Rhinehart that a judge would
likely sentence her to life with the possibility of parole; (3) mistakenly advised Rhinehart
about the nature of her post-plea appellate rights; (4) "coerced" Rhinehart into pleading
guilty at the plea hearing by squeezing her shoulder; (5) did not prevent Rhinehart from
pleading guilty, even though Rhinehart was allegedly depressed and anxious during the plea
process; and (6) refused to file a motion to timely withdraw Rhinehart's guilty plea. R. 9-13.
Rhinehart also alleged that her appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that, despite

4
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Rhinehart's failure to timely move to withdraw the plea, the plea could still be attacked on
direct appeal under the misplea doctrine. R. 13-15.

where she detailed the above claims (R. 18-20); (2) an affidavit from Corporon that
Rhinehart was crying and distressed during the plea hearing (R. 22-23); (3) an affidavit from
a reporter stating that Rhinehart appeared distressed during the plea hearing (R. 25-26); and
(4) an affidavit from Scott Williams, Corporon's co-counsel, who said that he was surprised
that Rhinehart accepted the plea offer because he was aware of some evidence suggesting
that she was innocent (R. 28-29).
A ft IT the State moves to dismiss Rhinehart's petition, Rhinehart submits se\ ei ill
documents outside of the pleadings in support of her petition
The State moved to dismiss Rhinehart's petition. R. 65-100. The State argued that
Rhinehart had waived any claim . f innocence below, and that her pleadings were "not
sufficient" to carry her burden on any of her remaining claims. R. " ; ' : - -0t'.

lie State

attached three exhibits in support of its motion: (1) the supreme court's opinion rejecting
Rhinehart's appeal; (2) the plea statement Rhinehart signed before pleading guilty; and (3) a
transcript of the plea hearing. K \ nl-63. In a si lpplemei itai i nemorandi tin that the State
filed before Rhinehart responded, the State reiterated its claim that Rhinehart had "failed to
allege facts sufficient to carry her burden under the PCRAz K. 188.
Rhinehart filed a memoranda im in opposition to the State's motion to dismiss. R 1.90210, Rhinehart attached four new exhibits in support of her memorandum in opposition.
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First, Rhinehart attached a newspaper article from a local newspaper that contained a
photograph of Rhinehart and Corporon at the plea hearing. R. 199 (attached as Addendum
F). Rhinehart argued that this photograph supported her claim that Corporon coerced her
into pleading guilty because it showed that Corporon's hand was "on [her] shoulder" and
"Corporon's face [was] frowning and very stern." R. 193.
Second, Rhinehart attached the signature pages from her plea affidavit and her postconviction petition. R. 201-02. Rhinehart argued that comparing the two signatures
supported her coercion claim, because the way she signed the plea affidavit made it
"appearf ]" that she was "struggling," while her "signature on the [post-conviction] petition
is very neatly written and conveys an upbeat attitude." R. 193,
Third, Rhinehart attached an article from the Deseret News regarding the delays in
Utah's death penalty system. R. 204-05. In that article, the Utah Attorney General's
spokesperson had "wryly" suggested that "no one gets executed unless they volunteer for it,"
and that Utah's death penalty has become a "legal fiction." R. 204. Rhinehart argued that
this supported her claim that Corporon was ineffective for advising her to take the deal in
order to avoid the death penalty because it showed that "there actually was really little
chance at all that Rhinehart would receive the death sentence here in Utah." R. 195.
Finally, Rhinehart attached several pages of what appeared to be anonymous internet
commentary about the possible effects of Lexapro, an antidepressant medication. R. 207-09.
2

In June 2010 (seven months after Rhinehart filed her memorandum in opposition in
this case), the State of Utah executed Ronnie Lee Gardner by firing squad. Gardner did not
volunteer for execution.
6
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Without any evidentiary support linking these alleged effects to her own case, Rhinehart
argued that this supported her claim that her plea was involuntary because she was taking
Lexapi o at the time of the plea R 195. ' • ' •
The State filed a reply to Rhinehart's memorandum. R. 217-25. Addressing
Rhinehart's coercion claim, the State argued that for purposes of this motion, it did "not
dispute that Corporon pi it her hand on Rhinehart's shoulder, noi does it dispute that
Rhinehart was emotional during the plea hearing." R. 222. But the State nevertheless
argued that "regardless of whether" these facts were true, Rhinehart had not proven coercion
under the applicable standard. R. 222-23.
The district court dismisses Rhineharrs ignition
The district court subsequently held a hearing on the State's motion. At the outset of
the hearing, the district court expressed its understanding "that this is essentially a 12(b)(6)
review hear in i; tn SOL1 if the pleadiims arc sufficient t;ikin:: nenthiru that ihc petitions is
saying as true." R. 271: 6. State's counsel responded that because the parties had "referred
to matters outside the pleadings," its motion to dismiss should actually be treated as a
summary judgment motion. R 2 71: 6 7. 1 1 le c ourt respoi ided: "I'm fine with that. "I he
standard's the same." Id. Rhinehart did not object to this, nor did she ask for time to present
additional evidence. See generally R. 271: 1-37.
The State then argued that summary judgment was appropriate on each of Rhinehart's
claims. The State argued that while it "obviously disagree[d] factually with some of the
claims that Ms. Rhinehart has raised," "given the posture at which we're here today . . . it's
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the State's position that even if her allegations are true, she still has not shown that she's
entitled to relief." R. 271: 7; see also R. 271: 10-19.
The post-conviction court subsequently issued a ruling dismissing Rhinehart's
petition. R. 233-37 (Addendum G). According to the court, dismissal was warranted
because Rhinehart had "failed to provide any evidence that would objectively demonstrate
that her counsel's representation was unreasonable." R. 234.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I: Rhinehart argues that the trial court improperly converted the State's motion
to dismiss into a summary judgment motion because it did not give her reasonable notice of
the conversion or an opportunity to present evidence. But conversion was required because
the court considered documents outside the pleadings that Rhinehart had submitted. Given
this, invited error bars Rhinehart's claim that she was not given proper notice.
In any event, this claim fails on its merits. Rhinehart submitted materials that were
outside the pleadings. When she submitted those materials, the rule required the court to
treat the motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment. Her own actions and the
plain language of the governing rule notified her that the motion to dismiss would be treated
as a summary judgment motion. This claim accordingly fails.
Point II: Rhinehart next argues that the trial court improperly granted summary
judgment. She has inadequately briefed that claim. Rhinehart makes no effort to delineate
her distinct legal claims from each other and has not cited to the record for the majority of
them. Even if the merits are reached, however, this claim fails because Rhinehart has not
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produced evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact with respect to any issue.
ARGUMENT
I.
THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT PLAINLY ERR WHEN IT
CONVERTED THE STATE'S MOTION TO DISMISS TO A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION ,
Rhinehart first argues that the district court plainly erred by improperly converting the
State's motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion. See Pet. Br. !*-20. According
to R hinehart, the district court ob\ iousl> and preji idiciall)- err -

*•

. - A.J, M

reasonable notice of the potential conversion, as well as by denying her the opportunity to
gather evidence in opposition to a summary judgment motion.
/i

•

,

ho wev er, Rhinehai t in\ ited any en 01 v;,v It'll respect to the

conversion by submitting materials that were outside the pleadings in her opposition to the
State's motion. She therefore cannot obtain relief for plain error. But even if reached, this
claim still fails because Rhinehart was given ample notice of the conversion, as well as a
reasonable opportunity to gather evidence.
A.

Background law.
' L;.V !l\h"6), Utah Rules of Civil I Procedure, allow s a district court: to dismiss a

complaint when the plaintiff has "failfed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
A rule 12(b)(6) motion "concerns the sufficiency of the pleadings, not the underlying merits
( >f a particular case." Tuttle v. Olds, 2007 ! J" I \pp 10, \ 1 • I , 1 55 P.3d 893 (quotations and
citation omitted). A court can also dismiss a complaint on summary judgment. Unlike a rule
12(b)(6) motion, summary judgment looks beyond the pleadings. The question is whether
9
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the "pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits,. . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c).
If a defendant files a 12(b)(6) motion but "matters outside the pleading" are
"presented to and not excluded by the court," the district court is required to convert the
motion to summary judgment motion. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 12(b); see also Strand v.
Associated Students of the University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191,193 (Utah 1977) (holding that if
the court relies on matters outside the pleadings, conversion is "mandatory"); Herbertson v.
WillowcreekPlaza, 923 P.2d 1389, 1391 n.2 (Utah 1996); Tuttle, 2007 UT App 10, ] 8.
If a district court considers matters outside the pleadings, thereby triggering
conversion, the court is required to give the parties a "reasonable opportunity to present all
material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." Utah R. Civ. Proc. 12(b); see also
Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 (requiring "adequate notice" and an "opportunity to submit
supporting materials"); Tuttle, 2007 UT App 10, f 8 (requiring "reasonable notice" and an
opportunity to submit additional materials).
On appeal from such a ruling, "labels do not control." Strand, 561 P.2d at 193 n.l
(quotations and citation omitted). Thus, if a district court, "in effect, properly treats . . . a
rule 12(b)(6) motion as one for summary judgment but erroneously characterize^] its action
as a ruling on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the ruling will be reviewed as if
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it had been a ruling on a motion for summary judgment." Id, (quotations and citation
omitted); accord Thayne v. Beneficial Utah, Inc., 874 P.2d 120, 124 (Utah 1994).
B.

There was no plain error with respect to the court's decision to convert
the State's motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment
1. This claim is barred by the invited error doctrine.
As noted, Rhinehart first claims that the court improperly converted the motion to

dismiss into a summary judgment motion. Pet. Br. 15-20. Rhinehart acknowledges that this
claim was unpreserved, but nevertheless argues that the district court plainly erred by not
giving her proper notice or an opportunity to submit opposing materials. Id. This claim
should not be reached, however, because it is barred by the invited error doctrine.3
Under the invited error doctrine, "a party on appeal cannot take advantage of an error
committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error." State v.
Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, f 26, 153 P.3d 804 (quotations and citation omitted); see also
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159 (Utah 1989). This applies when "counsel, either by
statement or act, affirmatively represented to the court that he or she had no objection" to the
challenged action. State v. Maese, 2010 UT App 106, ^f 11, 236 P.3d 155 (quotations and
citation omitted). A part}/ who invites error cannot obtain appellate review for plain error or
3

In her brief, Rhinehart initially claims that "the record is unclear" about whether the
court actually converted the State's motion to dismiss into a summary judgment motion. Pet.
Br. 17. During the hearing below, however, the court agreed with the State's suggestion that
because the parties had "referred to matters outside the pleadings,... we're at [the] summary
judgment stage rather than 12(b)(6) stage." R. 271: 7. Based on that ruling, the State then
repeatedly invoked the summary judgment standard. R. 271: 7, 10, 14, 16, 18-19. And the
court then relied on matters outside the pleadings in its ruling. R. 217: 12-13; 234-35.
But in any event, if Rhinehart is correct that the motion did not convert, this would
erase the predicate for her improper conversion claim, and it would fail for that reason alone.
11
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exceptional circumstances. See State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT 16, \ 9, 86 P.3d 742;
Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511,126.
In her response to the State's motion to dismiss, Rhinehart asked the district court to
consider several items that were outside the pleadings—including a photograph from the
Logan Daily Herald, an article from the Deseret News, and several unidentified pages of
anonymous internet commentary. R. 190-210. When the State argued at the hearing that
these materials required conversion to summary judgment, Rhinehart did not object, nor did
she ask for time to present additional evidence. See generally R. 271: 7. The district court
accordingly considered Rhinehart's evidence regarding Utah's death penalty system at the
motion hearing, expressly referred to the Logan Daily Herald photograph in its written
ruling, and appears to have considered the internet evidence as well, R. 217: 12-13; 234-35.
In short, conversion was required because the district court accepted Rhinehart's
invitation to consider extra-record materials as a basis for denying the State's motion to
dismiss. See Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b). By submitting such materials to the court, Rhinehart
"led the trial court" into converting the motion. Alfatlawi, 2006 UT App 511, If 26. Invited
error bars this plain error claim, and it should not be considered.
2. If reached, this claim fails because Rhinehart was given reasonable
notice and an opportunity to respond.
As noted, Rhinehart argues that the court plainly erred by converting the motion to
dismiss to a summary judgment motion. Pet. Br. 20. "[T]o establish the existence of plain
error and to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to,
the appellant must show the following: (i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the error should have been
12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant." State v. Dunn, 850
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). Rhinehart's plain error claim fails for two reasons.
First, she has not shown that the court committed any obvious error. Trial courts are
required to give the parties "reasonable notice" and an "opportunity to submit all pertinent
summary judgment materials" before converting a motion to dismiss into a summary
judgment motion. Turtle, 2007 UT App 10, ^ 8. The trial court did not obviously violate
either prong of this here.
Rhinehart had reasonable notice that conversion would occur when she filed a
memorandum affirmatively asking the court to consider matters outside the pleadings. She
also had notice that these matters might be at issue when the State filed a reply memorandum
arguing that, even if this evidence was true, it was still insufficient. Finally, Rhinehart was
given express notice of conversion at the hearing when the court agreed with the State that
conversion was required. R. 271: 7. Despite this, Rhinehart did not ever ask the court to
postpone its consideration of the State's motion, nor did she ever argue that she had had too
little time to effectively respond. In fact, she did not argue that a conversion had not taken
place. By her silence, she effectively acknowledged that she knew it had.
Rhinehart was also given "an adequate opportunity to rebut matters outside the
pleadings." Spoons v. Lewis, 1999 UT 82, f 4, 987 P.2d 36; see also Utah R. Civ. Proc,
12(b). The State filed its motion to dismiss on March 3,2009. R.65. On October 19,2009,
Rhinehart filed her response, accompanied by several matters outside the pleadings. R. 190.
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The trial court held oral arguments on the State's motion on March 31, 2010. R. 190, 23233. If Rhinehart believed that she did not have enough time to gather rebuttal materials
during the 12 months between the State's motion and the hearing, she should have filed a
motion asking for more time, or instead to allow supplemental briefing. She did not. Given
this, and given her own role in initiating the conversion, she cannot claim that she did not
have adequate time. There was no obvious error.
Second, Rhinehart also has not shown that this alleged error was "harmful." Though
she complains about the alleged lack of notice and opportunity to present evidence, she has
not identified what other evidence she would have gathered with more time, nor has she
articulated how this additional evidence would have defeated a summary judgment motion.
She has therefore failed to allege, let alone establish, that the allegedly improper conversion
prejudiced her. This claim accordingly fails.
II.
THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED THE PETITION
ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rhinehart next argues that the district court "erred in dismissing the petition on
summary judgment because there were genuine issues of material facts." Pet. Br. at 21-25.
This claim is inadequately briefed and should not be considered. But even if considered, it
should be rejected because there were no genuine issues of material fact with respect to any
of Rhinehart's claims.
A. This claim is inadequately briefed,
A party is required to set forth the "contentions and reasons . . . with respect to the
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issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial
court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on." Utah R.
App. P. 24(a)(9). This Court has repeatedly held that a claim is inadequately briefed if a
party4oes not cite to and analyze the record in conjunction with each claim. See, e.g., State
v. Bhagh Singh, 2011 UT App 396,14,267 P.3d 2%\\Morfordv. DCFS, 2010 UT App 285,
ffif 7-8, 241 P.3d 1213; State v. Steele, 2010 UT App 185,1 47, 236 P.3d 161.
Rhinehart alleged ineffectiveness of both trial and appellate counsel. R. 3-29. Her
ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim faults counsel for: (1) recommending that
Rhinehart plead guilty, even though some favorable evidence existed that Rhinehart could
have used if she had gone to trial; (2) allegedly advising Rhinehart that a judge would likely
sentence her to life with the possibility of parole; (3) allegedly misadvising Rhinehart about
the nature of her post-plea appellate rights; (4) allegedly "coercing" Rhinehart into pleading
guilty at the plea hearing by squeezing on her shoulder; (5) alleging advising Rhinehart to
plead guilty, even though Rhinehart was depressed and anxious during the plea process; and
(6) refusing to file a motion to timely withdraw her guilty plea. R. 9-13. Rhinehart also
alleged that her appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that her plea should have
been vacated under the misplea doctrine. R. 13-15.
Despite the wide array of claims, Rhinehart's brief fails to distinguish between them
in any meaningful way. See generally Pet. Br. 21-25. For example, Rhinehart lumps all of
her ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims together into a single conclusory analysis,
Pet. Br. 23-24, even though they involve a wide array of facts and different legal standards.
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Rhinehart also fails to properly support her claims with citation to the record. In fact,
Rhinehart's entire argument about these seven different ineffective assistance arguments
contains only two record citations, Pet. Br. 24, and Rhinehart makes no effort to delineate
which evidence created which genuine issue of fact with respect to which issue.
Strickland requires more. With respect to deficient performance, for example,
Rhinehart must identify the specific acts or omissions she alleges did not result from
reasonable professional judgment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688,690(1984). So,
too, with respect to prejudice. As with deficient performance, Rhinehart must articulate,
with specificity, how it is that she thinks the result would have been different but for the
individually identified errors. See Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993).
"[P]roof of ineffective assistance of counsel" therefore "cannot be a speculative matter[,] but
must be a demonstrable reality." Id.
Rhinehart's inadequate briefing has forced the State, and ultimately this Court, to
review the record for her to determine what evidence (if any) supported each of her seven
separate claims, as well as determine what legal standards apply to them, and how those
standards and facts work together in the summary judgment/post-conviction context.
As has been noted "many times before, 'this court is not a depository in which the
appealing party may dump the burden of argument and research.'" State v. Green, 2004 UT
76, % 13, 99 P.3d 820. Utah's appellate rules therefore require "not just bald citation to
authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority."
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998).
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Rhinehart has wholly failed to do this here. Given this failure, this claim is
inadequately briefed and should not be addressed.
B.

There were no genuine issues of material fact, and the State was
entitled to relief as a matter of law on all claims.
Even if this Court reaches the merits, it should affirm because Rhinehart has not

shown that there were any genuine issues of material fact.4
1. Background law.
Summary Judgment: A district court must grant summary judgment if "there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c). A court does not weigh the credibility of the
evidence when reviewing such a motion, but instead draws all reasonable inferences in
support of the nonmoving party. See Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283,
1292 (Utah App. 1996). Summary judgment serves a "salutary purpose in our procedure
because it eliminates the time, trouble and expense of a trial, when, upon the best showing
the plaintiff can possibly make, he would not be entitled to a judgment." Brandt v.
Springville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460, 462 (Utah 1960); accordAmjacs Intenvest, Inc. v.
Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 54 (Utah 1981).
A plaintiff cannot defeat a summary judgment motion by pointing to any question of
fact. Rather, a dispute of fact must be "genuine" to preclude relief. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56(c).

4

The following analysis is more detailed than the district court's. But it is settled that
a summary judgment ruling "may be affirmed on any ground available to the trial court, even
if it is one not relied on below." Smith v. Four Corners Mental Health Ctr.9 2003 UT 23,
142, 70 P.3d 904 (quotations and citation omitted).
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The "word 'genuine'" in this context "indicates that a district court is not required to draw
every possible inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, in favor of the
nonmoving party." IHCHealth Sews., Inc.v. D&KMgm% 7/7C.,2008UT73,Tf 19,196P.3d
588. Thus, summary judgment is appropriate unless there are "reasonable inferences" from
the evidence that preclude dismissal. Id. (emphasis in original).
A genuine dispute of fact must also be "material to the applicable rule of law" to
defeat a summary judgment motion. Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983).
The "mere existence of genuine issues of fact in the case as a whole does not preclude the
entry of summary judgment if those issues are immaterial to resolution of the case." Horgan
v. Indus. Design Corp., 657 P.2d 751, 752 (Utah 1982).
Moreover, while a single affidavit alone may be sufficient to create a genuine issue of
material fact, this does not mean that merely submitting an affidavit always defeats a
summary judgment motion. For example, vague or "conclusory" factual statements in
affidavits are not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. Norton, 669 P.2d at
859. Instead, to defeat summary judgment, an affidavit must allege "specific facts" that are
admissible as evidence. See Dairy Prod. Servs., Inc. v. Wellsville, 2000UT81,^J24,13 P.3d
5 81 ("Bald statements do not suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact."); Williams
v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723, 725 (Utah 1985) ("An affidavit which merely reflects the affiant's
unsubstantiated conclusions and which fails to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to create
an issue of fact."); Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Utah 1983) ("To raise a genuine
issue of fact, an affidavit must do more than reflect the affiant's opinions and conclusions.");
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Norton, 669 P.2d at 859 (Utah 1983). Similarly, a plaintiff also cannot defeat a summary
judgment motion by expressing legal conclusions in an affidavit. See Capital Assets Fin.
Servs., v. Lindsay, 956 P.2d 1090, 1094 (Utah App. 1998) (a trial court "must disregard"
legal conclusions in such an affidavit).
Ineffective Assistance: To establish ineffective assistance, Rhinehart must satisfy
Strickland's two-part test. If she fails to prove either part, her claim fails. See Strickland,
466 U.S. at 697; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P.2d 516, 523 (Utah 1994).
First, Rhinehart must show that her counsel's performance was deficient by
identifying specific acts or omissions that fall outside reasonable professional judgment.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88,690. An appellate court "must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that
is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Id. at 689 (citation omitted).
Second, Rhinehart must show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at 694;
see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, ^f 19, 12 P.3d 92. "A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. It is not enough to show that
the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Counsel's errors
must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable."
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787-88 (2011) (quotations and citation omitted).
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The ultimate burden in summary judgment litigation remains with the party who bears
the ultimate burden at trial. See Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, ^ 10, 177 P.3d 600. In postconviction, that is Rhinehart. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-105(1) (West 2009). Thus, to
avoid summary judgment on her ineffective assistance claims, Rhinehart must set forth
specific facts showing that there "is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to each
prong of the Strickland test." Archuleta v. Galetka, 2011 UT 73,ffi[42-43, 267 P.3d 232.
An affidavit that simply alleges that she was prejudiced does not suffice. See id. at *[fl[ 52-55.
2. The State was entitled to relief as a matter of law on Rhinehart5 s claim
that trial counsel was ineffective for recommending that she plead
guilty, even though some favorable evidence existed.
Rhinehart first claims that Corporon was ineffective for recommending that she plead
guilty, even though some favorable evidence existed that could have been used at a trial. R.
11-13. Though unclear in her brief, Rhinehart's underlying legal argument seems to be that
if there is any evidence from which a jury could find a defendant not guilty, defense counsel
violates the Constitution by recommending that the defendant accept a plea deal from the
State, rather than going to trial. See generally id.
From the State's review of the record, these facts supported this claim: (1) Rhinehart's
affidavit claiming that she was innocent and that she would not have pleaded guilty but for
Corporon's advice (R. 18-20), and (2) the affidavit from Scott Williams, Corporon's cocounsel, claiming that Craig Nicholls told him that Rhinehart "did not help him commit any
crime and did not ask him to commit any crime." (R. 28-29). Even if these allegations were
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true, however, the State was still entitled to relief as a matter of law because Rhinehart's
alleged facts do not establish deficient performance or prejudice.
Deficient Performance: To show deficient performance under Strickland, Rhinehart
must show that her counsel's conduct was "objectively unreasonable," State v. King, 2008
UT 54, % 18,190 P.3d 1283. Rhinehart must overcome a "strong presumption that counsel's
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, [she] must
overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be
considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (citation omitted). Because
Rhinehart bears this burden, she is entitled to relief only if she "persuad[es] the court that
there was no conceivable tactical basis for counsel's actions." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25,
% 6, 89 P.3d 162 (emphasis in original) (quotations and citation omitted). If she does not do
this, her deficient performance claim fails as a matter of law. See id. at f 7; State v. Holbert,
2002 UTApp 426,f 58,61 P.3d 291.
It is well settled that defense counsel may strategically recommend that a defendant
take a plea in order to minimize a possible sentence that would follow a conviction—even
where some evidence exists that is favorable to the defendant. In Hurst v. Cook, 111 P.2d
1029,103 8 (Utah 1989), the supreme court recognized that a defendant may "lawfully plead
guilty to a crime he factually did not commit to avoid risking conviction on another more
serious charge," or instead "in exchange for a lesser sentence." This is particularly true when
the State is seeking the death penalty. See, e.g., Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, fflf 37-38,
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203 P.3d 976; Myers v. State, 2004 UT 31, \ 21, 94 P.3d 211; State v. Gardner, 844 P.2d
293, 297-98 (Utah 1992).
Here, even if Corporon knew that Rhinehart claimed that she was innocent, and even
if Corporon also knew that Nicholls,had told Corporon's co-counsel that Rhinehart was
innocent, Corporon's advice that Rhinehart should plead guilty anyway was not
constitutionally deficient. The reason is that Corporon also knew about the compelling
evidence the State had showing that Rhinehart was guilty. This included proof that Rhinehart
had spent several months trying to obtain a life insurance policy on her ex-husband, that she
had forged his name in at least one attempt, that these efforts were motivated by Rhinehart's
demonstrable financial need, that Rhinehart's new boyfriend, Craig Nicholls, had murdered
her ex-husband shortly after she succeeded in finally obtaining a life insurance policy on
him, an earlier sworn statement to police from Nicholls directly implicating Rhinehart in the
murder, and testimony from several others witnesses claiming that Rhinehart had confessed
to them after the murder. See generally Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, ^ 3-6.
When determining how to advise Rhinehart, Corporon had to consider both the
inculpatory facts and the exculpatory facts. This is therefore not a case in which there was
unassailable, incontrovertible evidence affirmatively proving that a defendant was innocent,
no compelling evidence suggesting otherwise, but the defense attorney advised the defendant
to plead guilty anyway. Rather, this was a case in which there was strong, admissible
evidence from which the State could prove to a jury that Rhinehart was guilty—as well as
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some weaker evidence suggesting that she was not, and where defense counsel then made an
informed recommendation based on the totality of the evidentiary picture.
In short, given that the State had a strong case against Rhinehart for capital murder,
the Constitution did not mandate that Corporon advise Rhinehart go to trial and face possible,^^^,,
execution. Even if Rhinehart's factual claims are correct, Corporon's advice was not
constitutionally deficient. She therefore has not shown deficient performance.5
Prejudice: As noted, Rhinehart must also demonstrate "that there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. To prove this
regarding her counsel's advice to plead guilty, Rhinehart must also "convince the court that a
decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances."
Padillav. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473,1485 (2010). Thus, Rhinehart must not only prove that
the deficient performance led to her plea, but that without it, it would have been rational for
her to have gone to trial and risked a possible death sentence. A "mere allegation that she
would have insisted on trial . . . is ultimately insufficient" to prove this. United States v.
Clingman, 288 F.3d 1183,1186 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotations and citation omitted). Instead,
courts "will often review the strength of the prosecutor's case as the best evidence of whether
5

Additionally, nothing in this record establishes that Corporon even knew about
Williams' conversations with Nicholls. In Williams' affidavit, he says that he had the
conversations with Nicholls, and that he was then absent from this case during the period in
which Rhinehart pleaded; notably, Williams says nothing about ever relaying the
conversations with Nicholls to Corporon. R. 28-29. Moreover, neither Rhinehart nor
Corporon's affidavits make any mention of Corporon being informed of these conversations.
SeeR. 18-20,22-23.
23
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a defendant in fact would have changed [her] plea and insisted on going to trial." Miller v.
Champion, 262 F.3d 1066,1072 (10th Cir. 2001); see also State v. Hales, 2007 UT 14,f86,
152 P.3d 321 ("[I]n determining the effect of the error, we 'consider the totality of the
evidence.").
In the context of this particular claim, Rhinehart can therefore prevail only by proving
that it would have been rational for her to choose to ignore Corporon's advice and proceed to
trial, simply because: (1) she was willing to testify that she was innocent, and (2) Nicholls,
her co-conspirator, had told one of her lawyers that she was not involved in the crime.
But Rhinehart's credibility before the jury would have been in serious doubt. By the
time of this trial, she had already been convicted of burglary, an admissible crime of
dishonesty. See Rhinehart, 2007 UT 61, <fl 7. And by the time she testified, the State would
also have put on evidence establishing, among others, that Rhinehart had forged her exhusband's name in an attempt to financially benefit from his death, that her ex-husband had
been killed by her boyfriend, and that she had told several people that she was involved.
Nicholls' statements would have been similarly impeachable. By the time he even
could have testified in Rhinehart's trial, Nicholls was already a confessed murderer.
Moreover, he had earlier told police that Rhinehart had been involved in the plot to kill her
ex-husband. Thus, had he testified in this manner, the State could have impeached him with
his own earlier statements.
In short, the State could have proven its case with testimony from multiple witnesses
who were not confessed murderers and had no apparent financial or self-interested motive to
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lie, documentary proof establishing Rhinehart's motive in this case and willingness to lie,
and earlier confessions from both Rhinehart and her co-conspirator. Rhinehart, on the other
hand, would have apparently offered potential testimony from herself and her boyfriend, a
confessed murderer.
Under these circumstances, it would not have been rational for Rhinehart to have
rejected this deal—thereby exposing herself to possible execution—based simply on the
existence of this weak evidence. Like her deficient performance claim, her prejudice claim
also fails as a matter of law. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate on both fronts.
3. The State was entitled to relief as a matter of law on Rhinehart's claim
that trial counsel was ineffective for misadvising her about the
sentence she would receive.
Rhinehart next claims that Corporon was ineffective for making an incorrect pre-plea
prediction about the sentence she would receive if she took this plea deal. R. at 11. From
the State's review, these alleged facts supported this claim: (1) Rhinehart's affidavit alleging
that "Corporon told me the jury would likely give me a sentence of life without parole, but
that if I pled, the judge would definitely give me a sentence with the possibility [of] parole,
and I believed her" (R. 19); and (2) an article from the Deseret News discussing the general
delays in Utah's death penalty system (R. 204-05). Even if these facts are true, however, the
State was still entitled to relief on this claim as a matter of law.
First, Rhinehart's alleged facts fail as a matter of law to establish deficient
performance. As noted, Rhinehart must show that her counsel's conduct was "objectively
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unreasonable," King, 2008 UT 54, ^ 18, i.e. that it fell outside "the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
The reasonableness of an attorney's decision is assessed by what counsel knew at the
time of the decision in question, not by what counsel subsequently learned. Harrington, 131
S.Ct. at 789. Reliance on the "harsh light of hindsight to cast doubt on a trial that took place
[earlier] is precisely what Strickland . . . seek[s] to prevent." Id. (quotations and citation
omitted). An "ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim cannot survive so long as the decisions
of a defendant's trial counsel were reasonable, even if mistaken." Campbell v. Coyle, 260
F.3d 531, 551 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus, even if an informed decision ultimately proved to be
incorrect, this "shows merely that the defense strategy did not work out as well as counsel
had hoped, not that counsel was incompetent." Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 790.
Here, Rhinehart points to nothing more than a good faith prediction that ultimately
proved to be mistaken. Predictions like this one that later prove to be incorrect do not offend
the Constitution. This deficient performance therefore fails as a matter of law, and dismissal
was appropriate for this reason alone.
Second, Rhinehart's prejudice claim also fails as a matter of law. As noted, Rhinehart
must demonstrate "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. And to prove this in the context of counsel's
advice to plead guilty, Rhinehart must also "convince the court that a decision to reject the
plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla, 130 S.Ct. at 1485.
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On this record, Rhinehart cannot prove that she would not have taken this plea
agreement if she had been correctly informed that life without parole was still a valid
sentencing option. The reason is that the unrebutted criminal record already shows that
Rhinehart was willing to plead guilty even after being repeatedly informed of this.
In the written plea agreement, which Rhinehart reviewed and signed in open court (R.
154-55), Rhinehart acknowledged that she would be imprisoned for "either life without
possibility of parole, or an indeterminate prison term of not less than 20 years and which
may be for life, to be determined by the assigned judge herein, at an evidentiary sentencing
hearing." R. at 116 (emphasis added). Rhinehart further acknowledged that while she could
"produce testimony and evidence in support of a sentence of life," the State would be
affirmatively asking the court to impose the harshest sentence by "producing] testimony and
evidence in support of a sentence of life without possibility of parole." Id,
This possibility was also discussed at the plea hearing before the judge accepted
Rhinehart's plea. Early in that hearing, the judge informed Rhinehart that the "possible
penalties that attach to the offense are death, life in prison without parole, or an
indeterminate prison term of not less than 20 years and which may be for life." R. 132
(emphasis added). Rhinehart personally acknowledged these "possible penalties," and
further acknowledged that the plea only removed death as a possible sentence. Id.
Later on in the hearing, the court again advised her that she faced the possibility of
life without parole if she pleaded guilty. R. 142. The court explained that both sides would
have the opportunity to present evidence at sentencing, and that the court would ultimately
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decide whether she would, or would not, receive the possibility of parole. R. 142-43.
Rhinehart specifically acknowledged that she might receive a sentence of life without the
possibility of parole. R. 143. It was only after this that she pleaded guilty. Given that
Rhinehart was repeatedly,- unequivocally informed that life without parole was still an
option, and even that the State would be pushing for it, and yet she still chose to plead, she
has not shown that she would not have pleaded but for Corporon's alleged misadvice.
Moreover, as discussed above, Rhinehart also must prove that it would have been
rational to have rejected the deal on this basis—in other words, that it would have been
rational for her to have rejected the deal if Corporon had only given her a more correct
prediction. But the State had overwhelming evidence suggesting that Rhinehart arranged to
have her ex-husband killed for her own financial gain. Rhinehart has pointed to little
credible evidence suggesting otherwise. Had the jury convicted her, Rhinehart could have
been executed. Under these circumstances, it would not have been rational for her to have
rejected the deal on this narrow basis. This claim accordingly fails as a matter of law.
4. The State was entitled to relief as a matter of law on Rhinehart's claim
that trial counsel was ineffective for misadvising her about her
appellate rights.
Rhinehart next claims that Corporon was ineffective for giving her bad pre-plea
advice about her appellate rights. R. at 11. From the State's review, Rhinehart's sole factual
support for this claim is her own affidavit, where she alleges that "Corporon did not explain
to me that I was giving up most of my appeal rights by pleading guilty, and I did not
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understand that I was." R. 19. But even if this is true, her claim still fails as a matter of law
for two reasons.
First, Rhinehart's affidavit does not create a "genuine" issue of fact on this basis. See
IHCHealth Segys,, Inc., 2008 UT 73, \ 19 ("a district court is not required to dravvygvery
possible inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable, in favor of the nonmoving
party," but instead only draws "reasonable inferences" from the evidence). In the summary
judgment context, Utah courts "disregard" claims made in an affidavit if the claims
contradict the affiant's earlier sworn testimony, unless the affiant "can provide an
explanation of the discrepancy." Floyd v. Western Surgical Assocs., Inc., 773 P.2d 401,403
(Utah App. 1989); Webster, 675 P.2d at 1172-73. A "contrary rule would undermine the
utility of summary judgment as a means for screening out sham issues of fact." Webster, 675
P.2datll73.
Here, Rhinehart's claim that she was never informed of the limited nature of a postplea appeal is specifically contradicted by her own earlier sworn statements. In her plea
statement, which Rhinehart signed under oath in open court, Rhinehart said that she had
"discussed this case and this plea with [her] lawyers as much as [she] wish[ed] to," and that
her decision to "enter this plea was made after full and careful thought, with the advice of
counsel, [and] with a full understanding of [her] constitutional, trial, and appeal rights" R.
117 (emphases added). She also acknowledged under oath that she knew that if she were
"convicted" by a jury, she could "appeal," and that she was "freely, voluntarily, and
knowingly waiving" that right. R. 114.
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The trial court also placed Rhinehart under oath at the outset of the plea hearing. See
R. 125. During the ensuing colloquy, Rhinehart acknowledged that if she pleaded guilty, she
could no longer "contest [her] own statement of guilt on appeal," and she would instead
retain only the limited right to appeal certain aspects of her sentence. R. 141, 149-50.
When a defendant pleads guilty, she "must be bound to the answers [s]he provide[d]
during aplea colloquy." Ramos v. Rogers, 170 F.3d 560,566 (6th Cir. 1999); accord Barker
v. United States, 7 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 1993). Given that Rhinehart's affidavit
contradicts her own sworn statements, this Court should "disregard the affidavit," Floyd,
773 P.2d at 403, and instead conclude that Rhinehart has raised no genuine issue of material
fact on this issue.
Second, even if Rhinehart's affidavit is not disregarded, Rhinehart's ineffective
assistance claim still fails as a matter of law because these facts do not show prejudice.
As discussed above, a petitioner who alleges ineffective assistance must demonstrate
the result below would have been different but for the alleged error. Here, though, even if it
were true that Corporon misadvised Rhinehart before the plea about her appellate rights, this
alleged error was cured at the plea hearing when Rhinehart repeatedly acknowledged under
oath that she understood that she was waiving these very rights. R. 114-17, 149-50.
Thus, the undisputed facts show that correct advice from Corporon on this issue
would not have mattered, because Rhinehart still chose to plead guilty even after being
expressly informed of these very rights in open court. The State was therefore entitled to
relief as a matter of law on this postconviction claim.
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5.

Rhinehart proffered insufficient evidence to prove that Corporon
"coerced" her into pleading guilty.

Rhinehart's next claim was that at the plea hearing, Corporon physically "coerced"
her into pleading guilty. R. 11-13. From the State's review, these alleged facts supported
this claim: (1) Rhinehart's affidavit, where she said that Corporon "pressed firmly on my
shoulder during most of the plea hearing, intimidating me" (R. 19); (2) a photo from a local
newspaper of Rhinehart and Corporon at the hearing (R. 199); and (3) the signature pages
from her plea affidavit and her post-conviction petition (R. 201-02).6
Even accepting Rhinehart's allegations as true, this claim still fails as a matter of law
because Rhinehart's proffered facts establish neither deficient performance nor prejudice.
Deficient performance: Rhinehart's proffered facts are insufficient to show that
Corporon did anything coercive. Coercion occurs when there is "compulsion by physical
force or threat of physical force" that make an act involuntary. Black's Law Dictionary,
Coercion (9th ed. 2009). For example, a contract is considered to have been coerced when
there was a "wrongful act or threat which actually puts the victim in such fear as to compel
him to act against his will." Morgan, 657 P.2d at 753 (quotation and citation omitted).
6

In her petition, Rhinehart only alleged that this claim was actionable as ineffective
assistance of counsel. R. 7-13. She did not separately argue that the plea itself was rendered
involuntary by Corporon's alleged conduct. See generally id. The State accordingly
confines its analysis to Corporon's alleged ineffectiveness.
For clarity, however, the State notes that any direct challenge to the plea on this basis
would have been procedurally barred because Rhinehart could have raised it in a motion to
withdraw the plea. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(c) (West 2009).
Additionally, Rhinehart has separately argued that the failure to file such a motion was also
ineffective. As discussed below in Point 11(B)(7), that claim was also appropriately
dismissed.
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Here, Rhinehart's factual allegations do not create a "genuine" issue of material fact
about whether Corporon's conduct at the plea hearing met this standard. As noted, courts are
not required to draw "every possible inference of fact, no matter how remote or improbable,
in favor of the nonmoving party." IHC Health Servs., Inc., 2008 UT J 3 , fl 19Ar,Instead,
courts are only required "to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party."
Id. (emphasis in original).
Rhinehart is alleging that Corporon's grip on her shoulder at the hearing was so
physically coercive that she pleaded guilty against her will. R. 11-13. But the picture she
provided of that hearing (R. 199, attached as Addendum F) does not support this claim, even
when drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. Instead, as noted by the district court in
its written ruling, this picture actually shows Corporon touching Rhinehart's shoulder in
what is transparently a comforting manner. See id.; see also R. 234.
Moreover, the conduct at issue occurred in open court, in full view of the judge, the
bailiffs, the prosecutors, members of the public, and even the press. See R. 25-26, 199
(documenting the press coverage of this hearing). Despite this, the transcript from the plea
hearing contains no comment from anyone about Corporon doing anything that was
threatening or improper.

But if Corporan was actually "beatfing]" Rhinehart "into

submission to plead to the charge" as Rhinehart is now claiming, R. 193, the judge would
have noticed this and said something about it. Yet no one said anything at this hearing that
would support such a claim. Instead, the only commentary7 about the voluntariness of the
plea came from Rhinehart herself, who repeatedly told the court under oath that she was not
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being coerced into pleading guilty. R. 125,129-31. Absent some evidence to the contrary,
Rhinehart "must be bound to the answers [s]he provide[d] during a plea colloquy." Ramos,
170F.3dat566.
Thus, Rhinehart's proffered evidence creates no genuine issue of material fact
suggesting the Corporon physically coerced Rhinehart into pleading guilty. This claim fails
as a matter of law.
Prejudice: Rhinehart's prejudice claim also fails because her proffered facts do not
establish that Corporon's conduct at the plea hearing had anything to do with Rhinehart's
decision to plead guilty. To the contrary, the unrebutted record shows that this conduct
occurred after Rhinehart had decided to plead guilty, not before. This was confirmed at the
outset of the plea hearing. There, the court noted for the record that it had scheduled the
change-of-plea hearing because of a conversation it had with both parties Has previous day in
which the parties informed the court that a plea agreement had been reached. R. 124-25.
Rhinehart also confirmed this in the plea affidavit, where she acknowledged under oath that
she had discussed the agreement with her attorneys before deciding to accept it. See R. 112,
117. Thus, because Corporon's allegedly coercive physical conduct occurred after Rhinehart
had already made the decision to plead, it could not have made her decision involuntary.
In addition, this claim also contradicts Rhinehart's own sworn statements. In the plea
affidavit, she agreed that "[n]o threats or promises of any sort" had prompted her plea. R.
117. Rhinehart signed that statement in open court at the close of the plea hearing. R. 15455. Before she signed it, the court asked her on the record, while she was still under oath,
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whether her decision was the result of any "threats." R. 152. Rhinehart said there was not
R. 153. As noted, an affidavit which contradicts an earlier sworn statement should be
"disregarded," and therefore does not defeat a summary judgment motion. Floyd, 113 P.2d
at 403.

,,

.^-v.,^^^,;..

Finally, as discussed above, Rhinehart must show that it would have been rational for
her to have rejected the deal but for the deficient performance at issue. Thus, she must prove
that it would have been rational for her to go to trial and risk possible execution if Corporon
had not placed her hand on Rliinehart's shoulder at the plea hearing. Rhinehart has not done
this. For all of these reasons, this claim fails as a matter of law.
6. The State was entitled to relief as a matter of law on Rhinehart's claim
that Corporon was ineffective for not alerting the court that
Rhinehart was too depressed to enter a valid plea.
Rhinehart's next ineffective assistance claim is based on Rhinehart's alleged
depression at the time of the plea. R. 11-13. As with her coercion claim, Rhinehart's
petition only alleged ineffective assistance, and she did not separately ask for relief under the
PCRA based on a claim that the plea was involuntary. See generally R. 9-13.
Rhinehart's briefing below and on appeal have never clearly articulated the alleged
link between Rhinehart's mental state and Corporon's alleged ineffectiveness. So far as the
State can determine, it appears that Rhinehart's claim is that Corporon should have known

7

As with the coercion claim, however, any direct challenge to the plea on this basis
would have been procedurally barred because Rhinehart could have raised it in a motion to
withdraw the plea, but did not. See generally Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(l)(c). The State
limits its response accordingly. In addition, as discussed below in Point 11(B)(7), Rhinehart
has not established that Corporon was ineffective for not filing such a motion.
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that Rhinehart was suffering from mental anxieties, and that Corporon should have then
advised the judge that Rhinehart should not be allowed to plead that day. R. 11-13. In
essence, Rhinehart is apparently claiming that her mental anxieties were so profound that day
that any plea would have been involuntary, that Corporon knew this, and that Corporon
should have advised the court accordingly. Id.
From the State's review of the record, these alleged facts supported this claim: (1)
Rhinehart5 s affidavit, where she says that she "was clinically depressed and was not thinking
clearly or able to assert" herself when she pleaded (R. 18); (2) Rhinehart's affidavit, where
she alleges that, "[d]uring the plea hearing, [she] was crying and sobbing uncontrollably,"
that her "knees buckled," and she "was excused from the courtroom after [she] collapsed"
(R. 19); (3) affidavits from Corporon and a reporter confirming that she was "crying" during
the hearing (R. 22-23, 26); and (4) a newspaper photo showing that she was crying during
the hearing (R. 199).8
Even if this is all true, the State was still entitled to relief as a matter of law because
the proffered facts establish neither deficient performance nor prejudice.
Deficient Performance: Rhinehart's claim first fails because she has not proffered
sufficient facts demonstrating that she was so mentally distraught that day that she could not
Rhinehart also attached what appeared to be a printout from an unidentified website
containing anonymous comments about the effects of Lexapro on some people. R. 207-09.
Rhinehart made no effort to identify the website, let alone establish any link between those
comments and her actual condition at the time of this plea. This printout therefore lacked
foundation and was irrelevant, and it therefore could not support her opposition to summary
judgment. See generally Utah Pv. Civ. P. 56(e); see also GNSP'ship v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d
1157, 1164 (Utah App. 1994) ("Inadmissible evidence cannot be considered in ruling on a
motion for summary judgment").
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enter a valid plea. The reason is that, absent something more, depression and anxiety at the
time of a plea to murder do not make the plea involuntary.
The Utah Supreme Court recently rejected this very argument when Nicholls,
Rhinehart's co-conspirator, raised it as a direct challenge to his plea. The court explained
that "depression and anxiety are normal responses to the stressful circumstances attending a
criminal prosecution and possible death sentence," and "'anyone faced with the choice of
going to trial for capital murder or pleading guilty and receiving life without the possibility
of parole likely would be depressed and upset.'" Nicholls, 2009 UT 12, ^ 31 (emphasis
added) (quoting State v. Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, Tj 16, 983 P.3d 556).
The supreme court has therefore drawn a line between "mild to moderate depression"
and "psychological issues relevant to [a defendant's] competence to enter a plea."
Benvenuto, 1999 UT 60, f 20. Mere "[depression is not sufficient" to invalidate a plea.
Nicholls, 2009 UT

12^31.

Thus, regardless of whether Rhinehart was depressed and crying throughout the plea
hearing, this does not make her plea invalid. This distress was a natural consequence of
Rhinehart having murdered her ex-husband, as well her decision to now plead guilty to a
capital crime. Her depression and tears are not grounds to invalidate that plea, and Rhinehart
has not shown that Corporon even had a basis for attempting to stop the plea.
Second, the fact that Rhinehart was allegedly taking an antidepressant at the time of
the plea does not change this.
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In Oliver v. State, 2006 UT 60, % 4,147 P.3d 410, the supreme court rejected a request
for post-conviction relief that was similarly predicated on the petitioner having taken
psychotropic drugs at the time of the plea. According to the court, "the use of narcotics does
not per se render a defendant incompetent to stand trial, nor, presumably, to plead guilty."
Id. at f 7 (quotations and citation omitted). Instead, the plea is valid unless the petitioner
"prove[s] that his mental faculties were so impaired by drugs when he pleaded that he was
incapable of full understanding and appreciation of the charges against him, of
comprehending his constitutional rights, and of realizing the consequences of his plea." Id.
It is therefore the "drug's effect and not the mere presence of the drug that matters."
Id. This is because, in "most instances, . . . when a mood-altering drug is given to a
defendant by a physician, it is to improve the defendant's cognitive abilities." Id. at f 14.
"In other words, the fact that a defendant has undergone a medical evaluation and is
receiving medication to treat a psychological infirmity is often evidence weighing in favor of
a finding that the defendant is capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea." Id
(emphasis added). When evaluating such claims on appeal, courts are allowed to "rel[y] on
the defendant's own assurance (and assurances from counsel) that the defendant's mind is
clear." Id. at ^f 13 (quotations and citation omitted).
Though Rhinehart repeatedly refers to her alleged use of Lexapro in her brief, her
post-conviction affidavit does not actually allege that she was taking the drug at the time of
the plea, see R. 18-19, nor did she put forward any evidence of that through another source.
Instead, the only evidence that she was actually taking this drug comes from the transcript of
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the plea colloquy when Rhinehart informed the trial court that she was taking Lexapro for
"depression." R. 129.
But after learning of this, the court asked: "Does that medicine in any way affect your
ability to understand what you're doing here today by pleading guilty?!' Id. Rhinehart
responded: "No." Id. The court then asked she was "confident" that she was "in complete
control of [her] mental faculties and able to understand these proceedings?" Id. Rhinehart
said: "Yes." Id. The court further asked whether she had "any mental, emotional, or
physical problems or disabilities which would interfere with [her] ability to understand what
is happening here today?" Id. Rhinehart said: "No." Id. At the close of the hearing, the
judge accordingly found, based on his "discussion and colloquy with [Rhinehart]," as well as
its "observation" of her, the plea was entered "knowingly and voluntarily." R. 155.
Rhinehart cannot defeat summary judgment by contradicting these sworn statements
in a new affidavit. See Floyd, 113 P.2d at 403; Webster, 675 P.2d at 1172-73. Thus, the
only evidence in this record regarding Rhinehart's use of Lexapro is her sworn statement at
the plea hearing that though she was taking it, it had no negative affect on her and did not
impair her ability to understand what she was doing. The trial court and the post-conviction
court below were entitled to rely on this. Oliver, 2006 UT 60, \ 13. Given this, even if
Rhinehart was crying and upset during her plea hearing, and even if she was depressed, she
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still has not shown that she was so mentally distraught that she could not voluntarily plead
guilty. On these facts, the State was entitled to relief as a matter of law.9
Third, even if Rhinehart has alleged sufficient facts to show that she could not
voluntarily plead guilty that day, her deficient performance claim still fails because her
proffered facts do not establish that Corporon should have known that Rhinehart was so
mentally distraught that she could not enter a valid plea. Again, while Corporon clearly
knew that Rhinehart was distraught and crying at the plea hearing, that would not have been
a sufficient basis for Corporon to have rendered Rhinehart incapable of pleading. Instead, as
discussed, Corporon would have to have known that Rhinehart's mental issues went beyond
mere "depression." Nicholls, 2009 UT 12, If 31.
Nothing in this record demonstrates that Corporon knew this. In her affidavit,
Corporon affirms that Rhinehart was crying during the plea hearing, but says nothing about
knowing that Rhinehart suffered from any mental disorder that would have rendered a plea
involuntary. R. 22-23. And in her affidavit, Rhinehart alleges that she was "clinically
depressed," but she never alleges that she told Corporon this. R. 18-20. This omission is
significant. As recognized by the Supreme Court, the reasonableness of Corporon's conduct
"depends critically" on the "information supplied by" Rhinehart. Strickland, 466 U.S. at
691. Thus, even if it were true that Rhinehart suffered from such a condition, she still has
9

Below, Rhinehart further alleged that she "collapsed" during the colloquy and had to
be "excused from the courtroom." R. 19. Rhinehart does not rely on that allegation on
appeal. In any event, the transcript from the plea colloquy shows that what actually
happened was that Rhinehart asked if she could sit down'after the plea colloquy had
concluded and the plea had been entered, and that she then asked to be excused from the
courtroom when the only thing left was scheduling a future hearing. R. 160.
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not established that Corporon knew about it—and she therefore has not established that
Corporon performed deficiently by failing to alert the court to it.
Prejudice: As discussed, Rhinehart can only establish prejudice by showing that the
result below would have been different but for the alleged error. Thus, her claim must be
that if Corporon had recognized that Rhinehart was too distraught that day to properly plead
guilty, and if Corporon had somehow stopped the court from accepting the plea, Rhinehart
would not have pleaded guilty during some future proceeding once she was in a proper state
of mind. Thus, she still must show that it would have been rational for her to have rejected
this plea on this basis.
As discussed above, however, there was overwhelming testimonial and documentary
evidence of her guilt, and Rhinehart has only pointed to the possible testimony of two selfinterested felons in response. Moreover, Rhinehart wholly fails to account for the fact that
this deal gave her a substantial, tangible benefit: specifically, it prevented the State from
executing her. This claim accordingly fails.
7. The State was entitled to relief on Rhinehart5 s claim that Corporon
was ineffective for not filing a motion to withdraw the plea,
Rhinehart's last claim regarding Corporon is that Corporon refused to file a motion to
withdraw the guilty plea. Pet. Br. 11-12, 19. This was supported by Rhinehart's affidavit,
where she alleged that she "called Corporon five days after entering the plea and asked her
then and repeatedly thereafter to move to withdraw the plea, but she refused." R. 19.
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For purposes of summary judgment, the State must assume that this is true. But
judgment is still appropriate on this claim as a matter of law because Rhinehart has not
alleged facts demonstrating that she was prejudiced by this failure.
In order to establish prejudice for purposes of this ineffective assistance claim,
Rhinehart must show "that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694; Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225. But the "failure of counsel to make motions or
objections which would be futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance" of
counsel. State v. Whittle, 1999 UT 96, \ 34, 989 P.2d 52 (quotations and citation omitted);
see also State v. Chavez-Espinoza, 2008 UT App 191, *{ 13, 186 P.3d 1023.
Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 (West 2004) plainly states that a defendant can only
withdraw a guilty plea by demonstrating that the plea was unknowing and involuntary. See
also Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, ^ 26,184 P.3d 1226 ("having pleaded guilty, a defendant's
only avenue for challenging his conviction is to claim that he did not voluntarily or
intelligently enter his plea"). Thus, if Corporon had filed the motion to withdraw, it could
only have succeeded if Rhinehart could show that she either did "not understand the nature
of the constitutional protections that [s]he [was] waiving," or that she had "such an
incomplete understanding of the charge that [her] plea cannot stand as an intelligent
admission of guilt." Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 645 n.13 (1976) (citations
omitted). As discussed, there is no proof that this plea was deficient under that standard.
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Thus, even if Corporon ineffectively refused to file a motion to withdraw the guilty
plea, Rhinehart still not has not shown that that motion could have been successful. As a
result, her facts do not show that she was prejudiced, and the claim was appropriately
dismissed as a matter of law.
8. The State was entitled to relief as a matter of law on Rhinehart5 s claim
that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that the misplea
doctrine applied to this case.
Finally, Rhinehart claims that her appellate counsel was ineffective. Pet. Br. 14-15,
19. "[T]o prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, a Petitioner must
prove that appellate counsel's representation 'fell below an objective standard of reasonable
conduct and that the deficient performance prejudiced'" her. Lafferty v. State, 2007 UT 73,
lf39,175 P.3d530 (quotingBrunerv. Carver, 920P.2d 1153,1157 (Utah 1996)). Toprove
that appellate counsel "was ineffective for omitting a claim, [s]he must show that the 'issue
was obvious from the trial record and . . . probably would have resulted in reversal on
appeal.'" Id. (citation omitted); see also Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, H 25, 194 P.3d 913.
"Appellate counsel is not obligated to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal," however,
but is instead allowed to "winnow out weaker claims in order to focus effectively on those
more likely to prevail." Lafferty, 2007 UT 73, If 49 (quotations and citation omitted). Thus,
an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim only succeeds if a petitioner shows that
there was "a reasonable probability that, but for [her] counsel's unreasonable failure to file a
merits brief, [s]he would have prevailed on [her] appeal.5" Kell, 2008 UT 62, K 25.
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Here, Rhinehart's claim is that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that
Rhinehart's plea could be invalidated under the misplea doctrine. Pet. Br. 14-15, 19.
According to Rhinehart, appellate counsel should have argued that the misplea doctrine
applied because of Corporon's alleged misadvice, Rhinehart'^emotional distress at the plea
hearing, and the possibility that Rhinehart may have been innocent. Id. Summary judgment
was appropriate on this claim for three reasons.
First, it was not "obvious" that Rhinehart could have asked for relief under the
misplea doctrine. A defendant who wishes to withdraw a plea must file a motion under Utah
Code Annotated § 77-13-6. By statute, that is the "only" way that a defendant can challenge
the plea. See id.
The misplea doctrine is different. It is a judicial creation that applies when a plea has
been accepted and when a trial court—either on its own motion or at the behest of the
prosecution—rescinds the plea agreement over the objection of the defendant. See State v.
Kay, 111 P.2d 1294, 1304 (Utah 1986). The test for granting a misplea focuses, in part, on
whether there would be "undue prejudice to defendant" if it were granted—a test that would
make little sense if the doctrine were available for use by the defendant. State v. Moss, 921
P.2d 1021,1026 (Utah App. 1996) (emphasis added). With one exception discussed below,
it is therefore significant that all of the Utah decisions applying this doctrine have involved
cases in which the State or the judge (or in some cases, the victims) initiated the misplea
proceedings. See, e.g., Kay, 111 P.2d at 1296-97, 1302-06 (trial court rescinded unilateral
plea at request of prosecution and over objection of defendant); State v. Casey, 2002 UT 29,
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^fl[ 11,16,40 n.14,44 P.3d 756 (victim unsuccessfully sought misplea based on violation of
victim's right to be heard at change-of-plea hearing); State v. Lopez, 2005 UT App 496,fflf28,14-27,128 P.3d 1 (trial court sua sponte set aside guilty plea before entry of judgment, but
gave defendant a week to decide if he wanted to re-enter plea); State v. Bernert, 2QQ4 UT
App 321, l|ffl 2-5, 7-12, 100 P.3d 221 (trial court rescinded acceptance of plea at
prosecution's request and over defendant's objection so that case could be transferred to
county for prosecution of greater charge); State v. Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4,fflf2-7,12-32,
17 P.3d 1145 (justice court rescinded defendant's guilty pleas over his objection so that
greater charges could be brought in district court); State v. Moss, 921 P.2d 1021, 1022-27
(Utah App. 1996) (trial court sua sponte declared misplea upon discovering defendant's
guilty plea in abeyance violated statute).
The State has found only one Utah case—an unpublished memorandum decision—in
which a defendant sought the misplea. See State v. Schubarth, 2005 UT App 166U. There,
Schubarth entered a plea in abeyance that was clearly illegal under the controlling statute.
Id. at * 1. Because the plea was clearly illegal, this Court held a misplea was appropriate. Id.
Although this Court applied the misplea doctrine in reaching its decision, Schubarth was
more about a plea that was void from the outset than it was about a misplea, where the trial
court or prosecutor had violated the terms of the plea agreement.
Thus, the Legislature has already given defendants the ability to file a motion to
withdraw a plea. The misplea doctrine is something else entirely, a tool for use when it is the
State, the judge, or perhaps the victims, who desire to invalidate the plea. Given the
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overwhelming authority suggesting this, as well as the lack of any published authority
allowing defendants to use this as an alternative means for invalidating a plea, Rhinehart has
not shown that it should have been "obvious" to her appellate counsel that misplea relief was
even available. Her claim fails for this reason alone.

.w

Second, even the misplea doctrine was available to Rhinehart, it also was not obvious
the supreme court could have entertained a request for a misplea in Rhinehart's direct appeal.
As discussed above, Utah Code Annotated § 77-13-6 explicitly states that a defendant can
only move to withdraw a guilty plea prior to sentencing. In State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34,
^ 13-20, 114 P.3d 585, the supreme court held that this limitation is jurisdictional. A
defendant's failure to comply with this requirement therefore "extinguishes a defendant's
right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea" on direct appeal. Id, at f 17 (emphasis
added); accord State v. Grimmett, 2007 UT 11,ffif24-26,152 P.3d 306; State v. Reyes, 2002
UT 13, If 3, 40 P.3d 630. Rhinehart has pointed to no authority, and the State is aware of
none, definitively holding that the misplea doctrine supercedes this plain statutory limitation
on the court's jurisdiction. She has therefore failed to show that, based on the law available
to appellate counsel, it should have been obvious that the court had jurisdiction to entertain a
challenge to a plea under the guise of a misplea argument.
Third, even if appellate counsel had requested relief under the misplea doctrine, and
even if the supreme court had decided to address the request on its merits, it is still not
obvious that this request would have been successful. Subject to the timing limitations
discussed above, the misplea doctrine only allows a court to invalidate a guilty plea under a
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limited set of circumstances. Specifically, "'a misplea can properly be granted (1) where
obvious reversible error has been committed in connection with the terms of the acceptance
of the plea agreement and (2) no undue prejudice to defendant is apparent."5 Moss, 921 P.2d
at 1026 (citation omitted). Utah courts have also granted mispleas where "'some fraud or
deception by one party leads to the acceptance of the plea agreement by the other party or the
court.'" Horrocks, 2001 UT App 4, ^ 28 (quotingKay, 111 P.2d at 1305).
Rhinehart's misplea argument is based on the same claims of error at issue in her
claims about Corporon's conduct. As set forth above, there was no obvious error with
respect to any of these claims, and Rhinehart has not even alleged that her plea was the
product of fraud or deception. Rhinehart's appellate counsel therefore did not act deficiently
by failing to request a misplea on direct appeal.
CONCLUSION
Rhinehart did not put forth any evidence that created any genuine issue of material
fact, and the district court therefore correctly granted the State's request for summary
judgment. This Court should affirm the dismissal of Rhinehart's petition.
Respectfully submitted February *Z\, 2012.
M A R K L . SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

RYAljIp. TENNEY
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Respondent
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Utah R. Civ. P. 12, Defenses and Objections
(a) When presented. Unless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court,
a defendant shall serve an answer within twenty days after the service of the
summons and complaint is complete within the state and within thirty days after
service of the summons and complaint is complete outside the state. A party
served with a pleading stating a cross-claim shall serve an answer thereto within
twenty days after the service. The plaintiff shall serve a reply to a counterclaim in
the answer within twenty days after service of the answer or, if a reply is ordered
by the court, within twenty days after service of the order, unless the order
otherwise directs. The service of a motion under this rule alters these periods of
time as follows, unless a different time is fixed by order of the court, but a motion
directed to fewer than all of the claims in a pleading does not affect the time for
responding to the remaining claims:
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the trial on
the merits, the responsive pleading shall be served within ten days after notice
of the
court's action;
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement, the responsive
pleading shall be served within ten days after the service of the more definite
statement.
(b) How presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: (1) lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3)
improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of service of
process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, (7) failure to
join an indispensable party. A motion making any of these defenses shall be
made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted. No defense or objection
is waived by being joined with one or more other defenses or objections in a
responsive pleading or motion or by further pleading after the denial of such
motion or objection. If a pleading sets forth a claim for relief to which the adverse
party is not required to serve a responsive pleading, the adverse party may assert
at the trial any defense in law or fact to that claim for relief. If, on a motion
asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure of the pleading to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleading are
presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for
summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall
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be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to such a
motion by Rule 56.
(c) Motion for judgment on the pleadings. After the pleadings are closed but
within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on
the pleadings. If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the
pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in Rule 56,
and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material made
pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard and
determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court orders that
the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial.
(e) Motion for more definite statement If a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably
be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more
definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading. The motion shall
point out the defects complained of and the details desired. If the motion is
granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days after notice of
the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the court may strike the
pleading to which the motion was directed or make such order as it deems just.
(f) Motion to strike. Upon motion made by a party before responding to a
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading, the court
may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense or any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter.
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this rule may
join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available. If a party
makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein all defenses and
objections then available which this rule permits to be raised by motion, the
party shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the defenses or
objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this rule.
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(h) Waiver of defenses. A party waives all defenses and objections not presented
either by motion or by answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join an
indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a claim
may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted/or by motion for
judgment on the pleadings or at the trial on the merits, and except (2) that,
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise that the court lacks
jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The objection
or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in Rule 15(b) in
the light of any evidence that may have been received.
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading after
the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be deemed a
waiver of such motion.
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an action
resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may file a
motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges which
may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determination by the
court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the plaintiff to file
a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for payment of such
costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. No security shall be
required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the United States.
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court shall,
upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action.
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Utah R. Civ. P. 56. Summary Judgment
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of a
motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move for summary
judgment upon all or any part thereof.
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move for summary judgment as to all or any part thereof.
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion, memoranda and affidavits
shall be in accordance with Rule 7. The judgment sought shall be rendered if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the
issue of liability alone although there is a genuine issue as to the amount of
damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule judgment
is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a trial is
necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and
the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain
what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts
are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order
specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the
extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and
directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be
conducted accordingly.
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such
facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn or certified
copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit shall be attached
thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidavits to be supplemented
or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in
this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of
the pleadings, but the response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this
rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against a party failing to file
such a response,
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a
party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. If any of the affidavits presented pursuant to
this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court
shall forthwith order the party presenting them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused,
including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may be
adjudged guilty of contempt.
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167 P.3d 1046
Supreme Court of Utah.
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Tamra RHINEHART, Defendant and Appellant.

on appeal must be preceded by a motion before the district
court—is constitutional and has jurisdictional effect. See
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (2004). We also hold that Ms.
Rhinehart waived any right to challenge her bindover when
she entered her guilty plea. Based on these holdings, we
affirm the district court.

BACKGROUND
No. 20050635. I

Aug. 14, 2007.

Synopsis
Background: Following jury trial in which defendant
was convicted of burglary, defendant was convicted on
negotiated guilty plea in the First District Court, Logan
Department, Gordon J. Low, J., of aggravated murder.
Defendant appealed.
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Nehring, J., held that:
1 Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction on direct appeal to
review validity of guilty plea, and
2 defendant waived any alleged defect in bindover by entering
guilty plea.

H 3 Police discovered Mr. Boudrero's body lying in the
basement of a vacant North Logan home still undergoing
construction. Mr. Boudrero had been shot twice and left face
down in the doorway of a storage room. Within a week of
Mr. Boudrero's murder, police received an anonymous phone
call from a woman who claimed to know the murderer's
identity. The woman, later identified as Mamie Christianson
and Ms. Rhinehart's hairdresser, suggested that Ms. Rhinehart
was responsible for Mr. Boudrero's death. Ms. Christianson
proposed police contact Jessica Goalen, Ms. Rhinehart's
former babysitter and friend who, as we shall soon see, proved
to be a source of valuable information about Ms. Rhinehart's
ties to the murder. Ms. Christianson also suggested that Ms.
Rhinehart had a boyfriend from South Africa who was likely
involved.

Affirmed.
Attorneys and Law Firms
*1046 Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Laura B. Dupaix, Asst.
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, N. George Daines, Donald G.
Linton, Scott L. Wyatt, Logan, for plaintiff.
Elizabeth Hunt, Salt Lake City, for defendant.
Opinion
NEHRING, Justice:
% 1 Michael Boudrero's body was discovered lying in the
basement of a home under construction in North Logan, Utah,
in July 2003. He had been shot twice, once in the chest and
once in the back. Mr. Boudrero's ex-wife, Tamra Rhinehart,
pled guilty to aggravated murder for her participation in
the crime that took Mr. Boudrero's life. The district court
sentenced her to life in prison without the possibility of
parole.
11 2 After her sentence was imposed, Ms. Rhinehart brought
this appeal. She places a *1047 sizeable catalogue of issues
before us. We will speak to the merits of two of the issues.
We hold that the relevant statutory requirement contained
in section 77-13-6—an attempt to withdraw a guilty plea

% 4 That boyfriend was Craig Nicholls. Ms. Rhinehart met
Mr. Nicholls earlier in 2003 on the Internet. Mr. Nicholls
purchased a prepaid phone card in Brigham City, Utah, called
Mr. Boudrero from a pay phone, and lured Mr. Boudrero to
the vacant house by indicating that he had plumbing work
at the site that Mr. Boudrero might perform. When Mr.
Boudrero arrived at the house that fateful July evening, Mr.
Nicholls shot him.
K 5 Although Ms. Rhinehart was not present at the shooting,
she had incurred sizeable debts and had persuaded Mr.
Nicholls to kill Mr. Boudrero for her pecuniary gain. For
months prior to the murder, Ms. Rhinehart had been trying
to secure insurance policies on the life of her former husband
that named herself or one of her minor children as beneficiary.
When Mr. Boudrero learned about the existence of one
policy, he cancelled it. Other attempts by Ms. Rhinehart to
purchase insurance on Mr. Boudrero's life failed because
the applications were incomplete or because the companies
determined that the size of the policies was disproportionate
to Mr. Boudrero's means and therefore constituted excess
coverage. A persistent Ms. Rhinehart finally succeeded in
purchasing a $50,000 life insurance policy for Mr. Boudrero
in April 2003 in which she listed herself as the beneficiary.
Because the insurance company required Mr. Boudrero's
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signature prior to issuance, Ms. Rhinehart forged it. Ms.
Rhinehart described these efforts to secure life insurance and
the plan to kill her former husband to Ms. Goalen, who later
recounted the information to police.
U 6 Police arrested Mr. Nicholls. He later pled guilty
to aggravated murder and in accordance with his plea
agreement, provided police with a sworn statement regarding
his and Ms. Rhinehart's participation in Mr. Boudrero's
murder. Mr. Nicholls agreed to testify against Ms. Rhinehart.
(We considered an improperly brought challenge to his guilty
plea in State v. Nicholls, 2006 UT 76, H 6, 148 P.3d 990.)
U 7 In light of these events and associated evidence, the State
charged Ms. Rhinehart with one count of aggravated murder,
a capital felony in violation of Utah Code section 76-5-202;
one count of forgery, a third degree felony in violation of
section 76-6-501; and four counts of communications fraud,
a second degree felony in violation of section 76-10-1801. In
a separate information, the State charged Ms. Rhinehart with
one count of burglary, a second degree felony in violation
of section 76-6-202; three counts of theft, a second degree
felony in violation of section 76-6-404; and another count of
communications fraud.
H 8 The district court held a single preliminary hearing
where both Mr. Nicholls and Ms. Goalen invoked their rights
against self-incrimination and refused to testify against Ms.
Rhinehart. Instead, the district court *1048 admitted Mr.
Nicholls's and Ms. Goalen's sworn statements into evidence.
After being bound over on all charges, Ms. Rhinehart
unsuccessfully moved to quash the bindover order at the
preliminary hearing on the grounds that admission of hearsay
violated her rights under the Confrontation Clause of the
United States Constitution.
U 9 The burglary and aggravated murder cases were ultimately
severed. Ms. Rhinehart was convicted in the burglary case,
which proceeded first. She pled guilty nearly three months
later to aggravated murder in exchange for the State's
agreement to drop all other charges and to refrain fro mi
seeking the death penalty. Ms. Rhinehart appeals from this
plea.
ANALYSIS
I. WE LACK JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER
MS. RHINEHART'S CHALLENGE TO THE
LAWFULNESS OF HER GUILTY PLEA

Next

1 2 K 10 The Utah Constitution mandates that all criminal
defendants be afforded the right of appeal. Utah Const, art. I,
§ 12; see Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, \ 26, 122 P.3d 628.
Moreover, a defendant who has " 'been prevented in some
meaningful way from proceeding' " with a direct appeal of
right is likely to have been denied the due process of law
guaranteed in article I, section 7. Manning, 2005 UT 61, 1) 26,
122 P.3d 628 (quoting State v. Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1166
(Utah Ct.App. 1998)).
U 11 Ms. Rhinehart contends that the ineffectiveness of her
trial counsel caused her to enter her plea and to fail to bring a
timely motion to withdraw it. Under these circumstances, Ms.
Rhinehart insists, the requirement contained in section 7713-6 that she move to withdraw her guilty plea as a condition
to challenging her plea on direct appeal unconstitutionally
deprives her of her right to appeal.
H 12 Mindful that in State v. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, 114 P.3d
585, we settled the question of whether section 77-13-6
was jurisdictional and constitutional by answering "yes" to
both inquiries, Ms. Rhinehart has nevertheless labored to set
herself, her circumstances, and her legal claims apart from
those present in Merrill. See also Grimmett v. State, 2007
UT 11, H 8, 152 P.3d 306 (confirming the constitutional
and jurisdictional nature of the statute that experienced
a substantial revision from the version in Merrill ). She
argues that we should now answer "no" to the two Merrill
questions because it was her lawyer's fault that she entered
her plea and failed to bring a timely motion to withdraw
it. According to Ms. Rhinehart, neither Merrill nor any of
our other pronouncements on section 77-13-6 confronted a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. She claims that this
distinction matters.
3 K 13 It does not. The ineffectiveness of a defendant's
counsel may take many forms and result in relieving
a criminal defendant of an undesirable result. The
ineffectiveness of counsel that contributes to a flawed guilty
plea, however, can spare a defendant the consequences of her
plea only if the defendant makes out the same case required
of every defendant who seeks to withdraw a plea: that the
plea was not knowing and voluntary. See State v. West, 765
P.2d 891, 896 (Utah 1988) (remanding the case to determine
whether the defendant's original plea was knowing and
voluntary where the facts suggest that the defendant "received
nothing in return for his guilty plea" and "apparently received
seriously deficient information from all persons involved in
his case"). As a practical matter, there is no alleged flaw in a
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guilty plea of a defendant represented by counsel that could
not be attributed in some way to deficient representation.
Examples abound in our cases, but a review confined only to
the cases cited by Ms. Rhinehart, as illustrative of appeals that
did not involve claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
provides sufficient evidence to defend this point. Mr. Merrill
filed a late motion to withdraw his plea because he did not
discover until too late the effect the psychotropic medicine he
was taking may have had on his ability to enter a knowing and
voluntary plea. Merrill, 2005 UT 34, H 9, 114 P.3d 585. In
State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, 40 P.3d 630, Mr. Reyes claimed
that the trial court committed plain error when it failed to
strictly comply with rule 11 of the *1049 Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Id. U 3. The defendant in State v. Mullins,
2005 UT 43,116 P.3d 374, pointed to duress and his counsel's
misrepresentation of critical aspects of the plea agreement
as grounds for his motion to withdraw his plea. Id. % 3.
Each of these cases could easily have been recast as claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel and, presumably, have
been pursued under rule 23B of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure as Ms. Rhinehart seeks to do here.
K 14 The classification within which she seeks refuge—that
defendants who seek leave to withdraw pleas based on claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel are free of the constraints
of section 77-13-6—is, therefore, a phantom classification.
To honor this classification would be to invite every tardy
application to withdraw a plea to be styled as a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel, a consequence that would
vitiate section 77-13-6. We therefore hold that claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel raised in the context of
challenges to the lawfulness of guilty pleas are governed by
section 77-13-6 as construed by Merrill and confirmed by
Grimmett. We therefore are without jurisdiction to consider
Ms. Rhinehart's claim.

As we explained in Parsons, "The general rule applicable
in criminal proceedings, and the cases are legion, is that by
pleading guilty, the defendant is deemed to have admitted all
of the essential elements of the crime charged and thereby
waives all nonjurisdictional defects, including alleged preplea constitutional violations." 781 P.2d at 1278.
\ 16 Ms. Rhinehart attempts to avoid falling prey to the
general rule in two ways. First, she asserts that she did
not enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea and therefore
could not have waived defects in the preliminary hearing and
bindover. Next, she insists that even if her plea were lawful, it
is not the preliminary hearing and bindover itself with which
she takes issue, but rather with constitutional deprivations of
her right to confront witnesses at the preliminary hearing. She
argues that since those constitutional defects are jurisdictional
and not subject to waiver, we must take up their merits. We
disagree.
\ 17 We may with dispatch dispose of Ms. Rhinehart's
reinvocation of her challenge to the lawfulness of her plea.
Put simply, she cannot achieve through a challenge to the
bindover what she was foreclosed from doing by section 7713-6—assail the lawfulness of her plea.

\ 18 We turn, then, to Ms. Rhinehart's claim that she was
deprived of constitutional rights in the preliminary hearing
and that these transgressions stripped the court ofjurisdiction.
We note at the outset that the Utah Constitution expressly
permits the waiver of a preliminary hearing "by the accused
with the consent of the State." Utah Const, art. 1, § 13. In
light of this provision, it is difficult for us to conceive of
why a constitutionally authorized waiver of a preliminary
hearing would be foreclosed by the existence of defects, even
constitutional defects, that occurred during the hearing. Of
course, as Ms. Rhinehart properly notes, she never expressly
waived her right to a preliminary hearing and, in fact, fought
to exhaustion to prevail on her claims of preliminary hearing
II. MS. RHINEHART WAIVED HER RIGHT TO
CHALLENGE DEFECTS IN HER BINDOVER
error. The fact that she put up a stern fight does not mean
WHEN SHE ENTERED HER GUILTY PLEA
that she could not have surrendered and expressly waived her
constitutional challenges by waiving her preliminary hearing.
4 5 6 U 15 Ms. Rhinehart next asks us to relieve her of theIn our view, the entry of Ms. Rhinehart's guilty plea achieved
effect of her guilty plea because her preliminary hearing and
the same waiver of her constitutional claims as a waiver of
bindover were infected with errors. Except in those instances
her preliminary hearing would have accomplished.
in which errors affect the court's jurisdiction or where claims
of error are expressly preserved for appeal, a conviction
*1050 7 \ 19 Finally, we find little merit in Ms. Rhinehart's
or guilty plea acts as a waiver of earlier procedural flaws.
claim that the alleged denial of her right to confront
See, e.g., Benvenuto v. State, 2007 UT 53, % 31, 165 P.3d witnesses at the preliminary hearing implicated the subject
1195; State v. Parsons, 781 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Utah 1989);
matter jurisdiction of the court and was, therefore, immune
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935, 937-40 (Utah Ct.App.1988).
from waiver. Without subject matter jurisdiction, a court is

Ktavr

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

State v. Rhinehart, 167 P.3d 1046 (2007)
584 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2007 UT 61

powerless to adjudicate a case. See United States v. Cotton,
535 U.S. 625, 630, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002).
Ms. Rhinehart directs us to State v. Marshall, an unpublished
memorandum decision from our court of appeals, and its
observation that "a preliminary hearing is essential to a court's
jurisdiction over a felony." 2005 UT App 269U, para. 2,2005
WL 1405321. We are, of course, not bound by decisions
issued by our court of appeals. We take note, however, that
nothing in the court of appeals' decision leads us to conclude
that defects in a preliminary hearing strip a district court
of subject matter jurisdiction, including the jurisdiction to
assess the lawfulness of a preliminary hearing and bindover
and to adjudicate waivers of defects in preliminary hearings
and bindovers in the context of taking a guilty plea from an
accused.
Tl 20 We have held that a district court is empowered to
conduct a trial in the wake of an allegedly flawed bindover
because a subsequent conviction beyond a reasonable doubt
cures any bindover defect. State v. Winfield, 2006 UT 4,
D 26, 128 P.3d 1171. Ms. Rhinehart attempts to overcome
this proposition with the contention that a guilty plea is not
entitled to the same dignity as a "unanimous jury verdict
reflecting proof beyond a reasonable doubt." It is not evident
to us why a guilty plea is inferior to a jury verdict in this
respect, but more importantly, this argument fails to address
the central question of why a district court may exercise
subject matter jurisdiction to conduct a trial after a defective
bindover but not take a plea.
III. MS. RHINEHART FAILED TO PRESERVE
THE OTHER ISSUES FOR APPEAL

of Utah's life without parole statute. See Utah Code Ann. §
76-3-207(5) (2004). These issues were not preserved below.
Because they were not, we will not consider them absent plain
error or exceptional circumstances. See State v. Holgate, 2000
UT 74, % 11, 10 P.3d 346. Considering this rule, defendants
are best served by presenting unpreserved arguments to this
court through the lens of one or all of these exceptions.
Without more, the presentation of the merits of an issue
cannot access an exception to the preservation doctrine. Not
only has Ms. Rhinehart failed to persuade us that any of her
unpreserved issues are eligible for either exception to the
preservation rule, she has declined to present an argument to
support the application of either exception to those issues. We
accordingly decline to address their merits.
CONCLUSION
U 22 Because Ms. Rhinehart failed to make a timely motion
to withdraw her guilty plea as required by statute, we lack
jurisdiction to consider the validity of her plea on appeal.
Ms. Rhinehart's ineffective assistance of counsel claim cannot
successfully evade this well-established jurisdictional bar.
We further hold that Ms. Rhinehart waived the right to
challenge the validity of her bindover when she entered
a guilty plea. We decline to address the merits of Ms.
Rhinehart's remaining unpreserved issues. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court.
H 23 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief Justice
WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice PARRISH
concur in Justice NEHRING's opinion.

Parallel Citations
8 Tl 21 Ms. Rhinehart has asked us to take up the merits
584 Utah Adv. Rep. 16, 2007 UT 61
of her challenges to the manner in which the penalty phase
of her proceeding was conducted and to the constitutionality
End of Document
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MARY C. CORPORON #734
Attorney for Defendant
CORPORON & WILLIAMS, P.C.
808 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 328-1162
Facsimile: (801) 328-9565
SCOTT WILLIAMS #6687
Attorney for Defendant
43 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 220-0700

IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
STATEMENT TN ADVANCE OF PLEA
Plaintiff,
vs.

TAMRA RHINEHART,
Defendant.

Case No. 031100633
Judge Gordon J. Low

I hereby acknowledge and certify that I have been advised of and that I understand the
following facts and rights, and that I have had the assistance of counsel in reviewing,
understanding and completing this form:
1.

The nature of the charge against me to which I have agreed to plead guilty is

Aggravated Murder, a capital felony, in violation of U.C. A. Section 76-5-202(l)(f)(1953 as
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ft

amended). I have had an opportunity to discuss the nature of the charge with my attorneys, and I
understand the charge and the elements that the government is required to prove.
2.

I understand that the elements of the charge of Aggravated Murder are that I

intentionally or knowingly caused the death of Michael Boudrero for the purpose of pecuniary
gain. I understand that Utah law provides that "every person, acting with the mental state
required for the commission of an offense who directly commits the offense, who solicits,
requests, commands, encourages or intentionally aids anotlier person to engage in conduct which
constitutes an offense shall be criminally liable as a party for such conduct. I further understand
that a plea of guilty is an admission of all these elements.
3.

I know that the maximum possible penalty provided for by law for a conviction of

Aggravated Murder, under the terms of this plea, is imprisonment for life without possibility of
parole, and a fine, or both. I know that the minimum possible sentence under this plea is an
indeterminate prison term of not less than 20 years and which may be for life. I further
understand that this sentence can be consecutive to the sentence I am currently serving.
4.

I know that I can be represented by an attorney at every stage of these

proceedings, and I know that if I cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed to represent me.
I am in fact being represented by Mary C. Corporon and Scott Williams.
5.

I know that I have a right to plead "not guilty" and I know that I have entered a

plea of "not guilty," and I can continue to persist in that plea.
6.

I know that I have a right to a speedy public trial by an impartial jury (in fact I

presently have a jury trial scheduled to begin on April 7, 2005), and I know that if I were to stand
trial by jury:
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a.

I have a right to the presumption of innocence;

b.

I have a right to the assistance of two qualified counsel at every stage of

the proceedings;
, c.
d.

I have a right to see and observe the witnesses who testify against me;
My attorneys can cross-examine, in open court, all witnesses who testify

against me;
e.

I can call such witnesses as I desire, and I can obtain subpoenas to require

the attendance and testimony of those witnesses. If I cannot afford to pay the witness and
mileage fees of those witnesses, the government will pay them for me;
f.

I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do not have to testify at any

trial Whether or not I testify is my decision made in consultation with my attorneys;
g.

If I do not testify, the jury will be told that no inference adverse to me may

be drawn from my failure to testify;
h.

The government must prove each and every element of the offense charged

against me beyond a reasonable doubt;
i.

It requires a unanimous verdict of a jury of twelve to convict me; and

j.

If I were to be convicted, I can appeal, and if I cannot afford to appeal, the

government will pay the costs of appeal, including the services of two appointed counsel.
I AM FREELY, VOLUNTARILY AND KNOWINGLY WAIVING ALL OF
THE FOREGOING RIGHTS.
7.

I know that under a plea of guilty there will not be a trial of any kind. I will not

have a jury hearing of any kind, and the sentence will be imposed by the assigned judge herein.
3
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8.

I understand that by pleading guilty there will be no appellate review of any lawful

sentence imposed. I know I may appeal a sentence imposed under this plea of guilty only in the
following circumstances:
a.

If the sentence was imposed in violation of law;

b.

If the sentence was a result of an incorrect application of sentencing law;

c.

If the sentence is greater than the law allows as to fine or imprisonment, or

or

.

•

'

•

*

•

is greater than the sentence specified in this agreement.
9.

I represent that the following facts regarding the charge to which I am pleading

guilty are true and correct or that I do not dispute facts referenced below for which I do not have
personal knowledge:
a.

In early 2003,1 became acquainted with my co-defendant, Mr. Craig

Nicholls;
b.

In 2003,1 made statements to Mr. Nicholls which he understood and

interpreted as a request on my part for him to murder my former husband, Michael
Boudrero;
c.

Michael Boudrero was murdered by shooting in Cache County, Utah in

July of 2003;
d.

I was not present at the time of the shooting of Michael Boudrero, but I am

informed and believe by reason of my prior conversations with Mr. Nicholls and by
reason of Mr. Nicholls' subsequent statements, that he is the person who shot Michael

4
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Boudrero, and that Mr. Nicholls did so at my request and instigation. I intended the deatli
of Michael Boudrero to occur by the foregoing circumstances;
e.

I was, therefore, a party accomplice to the murder of Michael Boudrero;

f.

I made efforts to obtain life insurance policy(s) on the life of Michael

and

Boudrero and intended that I or my minor children would receive life insurance benefits
and/or social security benefits upon the death of Michael Boudrero.
10.

The only terms and conditions pertaining to this plea agreement between me and

the State are as follows:
a.

I will plead guilty to Count 1 of the Information. Aggravated Murder;

b.

The State agrees to dismiss the remaining counts of the Information;

c.

The State agrees it will not seek and is specifically withdrawing its request

to impose the death penalty, and the Court will not impose the death penalty; and
d.

Pursuant to Utah law, I agree I will serve a period of incarceration for this

offense, of either life without possibility of parole, or an indeterminate prison term of not
less than 20 years and which may be for life, to be determined by the assigned judge
herein, at an evidentiary sentencing hearing. I understand that at this hearing I may
produce testimony and evidence in support of a sentence of life and that the State will
produce testimony and evidence in support of a sentence of life without possibility of
parole.
11.

I know I have a right to ask the Court any questions I wish to ask concerning my

rights, or about these proceedings and the plea.
5
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12.

I make the following representations to the Court:
a.

I am 46 years of age. My education consists of high school. I can read and

understand English;
b.

.

No threats or promises of any sort have been made to me to induce me or

persuade me to enter this plea, other than the representations of this plea agreement and
the provisions contained herein;
c.

No one has told me that I would receive probation, or any other form of

special leniency because of my plea;
d.

I have discussed this case and this plea with my lawyers as much as I wish

e.

I am satisfied with my lawyers, Mary C. Corporon and Scott Williams; and

f.

My decision to enter this plea was made after full and careful thought,

to;

with the advice of counsel, with a full understanding of my constitutional, trial, and
appeal rights, with a full understanding of the evidence the State would adduce at trial in
. the case and with a full understanding of the consequences of the plea. I was not under the
influences of any drugs, medications, or intoxicants when the decision to enter this plea
wTas made and I am not now under the influence of any drugs, medications, or intoxicants.
13.

I understand that I have the right to file a motion to withdraw this plea of guilty

only if made prior to sentence being imposed. Such a motion, if made, will not be automatically
granted and will be granted only upon leave of the court and a showing that my plea of guilty was

6
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not loiowingly and voluntarily made.
14.

I have no mental reservations concerning this plea.

DATED this 18th day of March, 2005 in open court.

TAMRA RHINEHAKT
Defendant

l

^^y<2>z?^?/?&~^
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CERTIFICATE OF ATTORNEY
We certify that we are the attorneys for TAMRA RHINEHART, the Defendant above and
that we know she has read the statement or that we have read it to her and we have discussed it
with her and believe that she fully understands the meaning of its contents and is mentally and
physically competent to enter this plea. To the best of our knowledge and belief after an
appropriate investigation, the elements of the crime and factual synopsis of the Defendant's
criminal conduct are correctly stated and these, along with the other representations and
declarations made by the Defendant in the foregoing Statement in Advance of Plea are accurate
and true.
DATED this 18th day of March, 2005.

§£OTT WILLIAMS
Attorney for Defendant

8
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CERTIFICATE OF COUNTY ATTORNEY

.

I certify that I am the attorney for the State of Utah in the case against TAMRA
RHINEHART, Defendant. I have reviewed this Statement of the Defendant and find that the
declaration, including the elements of the offense of the charge are true and correct. No improper
inducements, threats, or coercion to encourage a plea have been offered Defendant. The plea
negotiations are fully contained in the Statement in Advance of Plea attached or as supplemented
on the record before the Court. There is reasonable cause to believe that the evidence would
support the conviction of Defendant for the offense for which the plea is entered and acceptance
of the plea would serve the public interest.
DATED this 18th day of March, 2005

SCGTXJtfYATT
Cache County Attorney's Office
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IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL' DISTRICT COURT
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 031100633

vs
TAMRA RHINEHART,
Defendant.

Transcript of Change of Plea Hearing.
Honorable Gordon J. Low presiding.
First District Court Courthouse
Logan, Utah
March 18, 2005

APPEARANCES:
For the Plaintiff:

SCOTT L. WYATT
ERUCE G. WARD
Deputy County Attorneys

For the Defendant:

MARY C. CORPORON
Attorney at Law

RODNEY M. FELSHAW
Registered Professional Reporter
First District Court
P. O. Box 873
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1

THE COURT:

Case number 031100633, State of Utah

2

versus Tamara Rhinehart.

3

morning pursuant to a conversation this court had yesterday

4

with counsel for both the state and the defense.

5

understanding that there has been a resolution found in this

6

case that Ms. Rhinehart, whose trial was set for the 7th of

7

April through the 4th of May, has decided to enter a change •

8

of plea, that being a plea of guilty to a third amended

9

information.

10

This matter is on the calendar this

Ms. Rhinehart is present with Ms. Corporon.

It ! s my

The state is

11

represented by Mr. Wyatt and Mr. Ward.

12

co-counsel in this matter, is not present.

13

Ms. Rhinehart is prepared to waive his presence.on her

14

behalf.

15

Mr. Williams, who is
I understand that

Procedurally, Ms. Rhinehart, I'm going to ask you to
ITm going to ask the

16

stand with your attorney at the podium.

17

clerk to administer an oath and have you sworn.

18

intent to•conduct a colloquy and discussion with you relative

19

to this plea.

20

is made intelligently and knowingly, voluntarily and

21

intentionally.

22

for our discussion which you'll follow along with.

23

the state has prepared —

24

prepared, rather, with the state's approval, a'statement in

25

advance of plea which will in some form duplicate some of the

It's then my

It is a requirement that I find that this plea'

In order to do so, I have prepared a colloquy
And then

actually, Ms. Corporon has
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1
2

things I'm going to say in our.colloquy.
First, there's been a third information filed which

3

charges the defendant with a single count of criminal

4

homicide, aggravated murder, a capital offense, in violation

5

of Utah Code section 76-5-202(1)(f).

6

the undersigned, Scott L. Wyatt, deputy county attorney, and

.7

The charge is that, by

under oath, that upon belief and information the defendant,

8

in Cache County, Utah, committed the offense of criminal

9

homicide, aggravated murder.

10

The elements of that charge are

that Tamra Rhinehart, on or about the 8th of July of 2003,

11 J intentionally or knowingly caused the death of .Michael •
12

Boudrero for pecuniary gain.

13

information charging a single count of aggravated murder,

14

criminal homicide.

15'
•

•

#

That is the third amended

Now, then, if the clerk will administer the oath to the

•

*f
jl6

defendant.

17

TAMRA RHINEHART,

18

being first duly sworn, was examined and

19

testified as follows:

20

THE COURT:

The record will reflect that the

21

defendant has been put under oath.

22

Mr. Wyatt or Ms. Corporon, before I conduct colloquy?

23

MS. CORPORON:

24

MR. WYATT:

Any preliminary matters,

No, Your Honor.

No.

25
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1

EXAMINATION

2

BY THE COURT:

3

Q.

4

information.

5

microphone.

6

to you?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Were there any questions in your mind as to the elements

9

of that charge?

Ms. Rhinehart, I just read to you the third amendedI need you to answer affirmatively into the
Did you understand the charge which I just read

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

You understand the crime with which you've been charged?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

I'm going to read some things and then ask you a number

14

of questions, which I'd ask you to answer audibly.

15

the time set for your change of plea in this case, State of

16

Utah versus Tamra Rhinehart.

17

This is-

I note that you are present, as is your counsel, Mary

18

Corporon.

Scout. Williams is not present.

First, I want to

19

ask you, with respect to Mr. Williams, you recognize that you

20

have the right, by appointment of this court, to two defense

21

attorneys throughout the proceedings.

22

Williams and Ms. Corporon have worked together to assist you,

23

but he's not here today.

24

right to have Mr. Williams here to assist you today?

25

A.

Heretofore Mr.

Do you affirmatively waive your

Yes.
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1

Q.

And that's a waiver made knowingly and voluntarily by you

2

and because you think it is in your best interest to proceed

3

this morning?

4

A.

Yes.

5

THE COURT:

Counsel for the state, Scott Wyatt, and

6

Bruce Ward are present.

7

Rules of Criminal Procedure, a court may permit parties to

8

disclose their plea agreements and the reasons for it.

•' 9

intend to do that.

Under Rule 11(h)(2) of the Utah

I

Any agreement needs to adequately address

10

the interests of society, especially in relation for any pain

.11

and loss suffered by the victims in this case. • The harm to

12

any innocent person cannot be lightly treated and the

13

punishment cannot be easily dismissed. •

14

The parties have suggested a joint resolution of this

15

case.

Mr. Wyatt, you have indicated that it is a change of

16

plea to guilty of aggravated murder as now charged under the

17

third amended information.

18

the defendant the death penalty.

The state will not seek against.
Is that correct, Mr. Wyatt?

19

MR. WYATT:

Yes.

20

THE COURT:

Ms. Corporon, you've indicated that

21

based upon this condition Ms. Rhinehart is willing to plead

22

guilty and have her sentence determined by this court in a

23

future sentencing hearing.

24

MS. CORPORON:

25

THE COURT:

Is that correct?

That is my understanding, Your Honor.

I will address further her right to a
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1

jury in regard to that matter, but as far as this matter is .

2

concerned right now, at this point, it's' her intent to enter

3

a plea of guilty and have the sentence determined by the

4

court, not a jury?

5
6

MS. CORPORON:

That's my understanding, Your Honor,

yes.

7

THE COURT:

The court finds the recommendation,

8

based upon the information at this point received, as being

9

acceptable.

The defendant has been sworn and is now under

10

oath.

11

Q.

12

hearing is for' you to enter a plea of guilty to the state's

13

charge against you.

14

understand, everything that is going on and everything that I

15

will be explaining to you.

16

or something that I tell you, I will try to explain it to you

17

in a clear fashion.

18

time about what we're discussing.

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Ms. Rhinehart, how old are you?

21

A.

46.

22

Q.

And how far did you go in school?

23

A.

Eleventh grade.

24

Q.

And can you read and write the English language?

25

A.

Yes.

(BY THE COURT)

Ms. Rhinehart, the purpose of this

In order to do so it is vital that you

If you do not understand anything

Or I will let you talk to counsel at any
Do you understand that?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i -%/n

Page 7
Ms. Rhinehart, have you taken any alcohol or drugs or any

1

Q.

2

oth er medication within the last 48 hours?

3

A.

Just my prescriptions.

4

Q.

What is that?

5

A.

Lexapro.

6

Q.

And what is that for? .

7

A.

Depression.

8

Q.

Does that medicine in any way affect your ability tg>.

9

understand what you're doing here today by pleading guilty?

•

10

A.

No.

11

Q.

Are you confident that you are in complete control of •

12

your mental faculties and able to understand these

13

proceedings?

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Do you currently, as far as you know, have any mental,

16

emotional or physical problems or disabilities which would

17

interfere with your ability to understand what is happening

18

here today?

19

A.

No.

20

Q.

Has anyone forced, threatened or coerced you in any way

21

to enter into this guilty plea?

22

A.

No.

23

Q.

Has anyone made any promises to you in connection with

24

your guilty plea other than those contained in the plea

25

agreement?
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Have you read that plea agreement?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

Do you understand each and all of its terms and

5

provisions?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Are there any which are unclear to you?

8

A.

No.

9

Q.

Are you in fact entering this guilty plea of your own

..

10

free will and choice?

11

A.

Yes.

...

. " . . '

12

THE COURT:

Mr. Wyatt, has the family of the victim'

13

in this case been fully informed of the contents of the plea

14

agreement and notified of this hearing?

15

•

16

MR. WYATT:

They have.

And they're here present. .

THE COURT:

I have mentioned that the plea agreement

17

is that the defendant will plead as charged to the third

18

amended information, criminal homicide, aggravated murder.

19

And that the option of the death penalty is not any more to

20

be considered, but in fact the only consideration relative to

21

sentence before the court will be either life with parole or .

22

life without, parole in the Utah State Prison, is that

23

correct?.

24

MR. WYATT:

That is correct.

25

THE COURT:

That is the entirety of the agreement,
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1 | with the addition of dismissal of the other charges under the
2 | second amended information?

4 |

MR. WYATT:

That's correct.

THE COURT:

Ms. Corporon, is that your full

5 I understanding of the agreement?
6 |
.7 IQ.

MS. CORPORON:
(BY THE COURT)

That is my understanding.

Ms. Rhinehart, is that your understanding

of the agreement?
A.

Yes.

10 I Q. . Ms.. Rhinehart, have you had an opportunity to thoroughly
11

discuss this plea agreement with your attorneys?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Do you understand the terms and provisions of the' plea

14

agreement?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Does the plea agreement represent in its entirety the

17

understanding that you have with the State of Utah?

18 I A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Has anyone made any other promises or assurances of any

20

kind to you in an effort to convince you to plead guilty?

21

A.

No.

22

Q.

Other than as stated by Mr. Wyatt in my question just a

23

moment ago, have any.other additional charges been dismissed,

24

or have' you been promised that any additional charges will be

25

dismissed, as a result of this plea agreement?
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1

A.

No.

2

Q.

Other than as stated by Mr. Wyatt., have you been promised

3

that additional charges will not filed in exchange for this

4

plea agreement?

5

Wyatt, that you would otherwise intend to file but have •

6

agreed not to? .

7

Are. there any other charges out there, Mr.

MR". WYATT:

No, Your Honor.

There is nothing else .

8

that's pending that we are aware of or that is part of this

9

agreement.

10

Q.

(BY THE COURT)

Ms. Rhinehart, in the single count of the

11

third amended information you have been charged with the

12

offense of aggravated murder, which is classified as a

13

capital felony under the laws of the state of Utah.

14

possible penalties that attach to the offense are death, life

15

in prison without parole, or an indeterminate prison term of

16

not less than 20 years and which may be for life.

17

understand that these are the possible penalties that attach

18

to.the offense of aggravated murder?

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

The state has stipulated, and the court agrees, that the

21

death penalty will not be a penalty option in this case.

22

that likewise your understanding of the plea agreement?

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Ms. Rhinehart, you have been charged as a party to the

25

offense of aggravated murder.

The

Do you

Is

This.means that although you
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1

did not directly cause the death of Michael Boudrero, you

2

nevertheless acted with the mental state required for the

3

commission of the aggravated murder.

4

requested, commanded, encouraged or intentionally aided other

5

another person, namely Craig Nicholls, to engage in conduct

6

which constituted the offense of aggravated murder.

7

And either solicited,

Under the laws of the state of Utah, as a party to the

8

offense of aggravated murder, you can be held criminally

9

liable for this offense.

Do you understand that you can be

10

held criminally liable for the offense of aggravated murder,

11

even though you did not directly cause the death of Mr.

12

Michael Boudrero?

13

A.

Yes.

.14

Q.

The elements of the offense as has been charged against

15 I you in the amended information is as follows.

First, as a

16

party to the offense you either solicited, requested,

17

commanded, encouraged or intentionally, aided Craig Nicholls

18

in causing the death of Michael Boudrero.

19

the death of Michael Boudrero was caused intentionally or

20

knowingly.

21

one, while Mr.. Nicholls was engaged in the commission of or

22

an attempt to commit, or- flight after committing or

23

attempting to commit aggravated robbery, robbery, aggravated

24

kidnapping or kidnapping.

25

personal gain.

Two, or second,

And, third, the homicide was committed either,

Two, for pecuniary or other

Three, you engaged or employed Mr. Nicholls
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1

to commit the homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract

2

for remuneration, or the' promise of remuneration, for the

3

commission of the homicide.

4

Do you understand that these are the' elements of the

5

offense of aggravated murder as has been charged against you?

6

A.

Yes.

7

Q.

Ms. Rhinehart, do you also understand that if you choose

8

not to plead guilty the state would bear' the burden of

.9 proving in a trial each of the foregoing elements of this
10

offense beyond a resonable doubt?

11

A.

Yes.

12

Q.

If the state should fail to establish even one of the

13

elements of aggravated murder beyond a. reasonable doubt you

14

would be found not guilty of the offense.

15

that?

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

You have discussed entering this plea with your

18

attorneys? .

19

A.

Yes.

20

Q.

Have you had adequate opportunity • to' spend time with your

21

attorneys so that they could answer your questions?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Have your attorneys answered all of your questions?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Are you fully satisfied with the counsel, representation

Do you understand
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1 | and advice you've received, and which has been given to you,
2 I by your attorneys?

3 I A. Yes.
4 | Q.

Do you need additional time.to confer with your.

5 I attorneys, specifically Ms. Corporon, this morning?
6

A.

No.

Q.

Ms. Rhinehart, have you had a chance to read the plea

agreement, as I asked you earlier, in its entirety?
A.
10 I Q.

Yes.
Have you gone over that plea agreement with your

111 attorneys?
12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Have your attorneys reviewed with you the elements of the

14

offense of aggravated murder, as has been charged against

15

you, and the possible penalties attached to this offense as

16

set.forth in the plea agreement?

17

A.

18 J Q.

Yes.
Have you been made aware of the evidence the state would

19

present against you in this case if it went to trial?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Based upon the evidence the state would introduce at

22

trial,, do you believe that there is a substantial, chance that

23' if the jury believed the state's evidence you would, be found
24

guilty of aggravated murder?

25

A.

Yes.
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1

Q.

2

are set for in the plea agreement?

3

A.

Yes.

4

Q.

To you need more time this morning to talk to your

5

attorney about the plea agreement itself?

6

A.

7

Have your attorneys reviewed with you the rights which

No."
THE COURT:

Ms. Corporon, have you reviewed the

8

evidence in this matter and reviewed the evidence as relates

9

to the elements of the offense charged?

10

MS. CORPORON:

11

THE COURT:

12

Exhaustively, Your Honor.

Do you believe that a factual basis

exists for this plea?

13

MS. CORPORON:

14

THE COURT:

I do.

Do you believe' that there's a

15

substantial chance that your client would be convicted of the

16

offense of aggravated murder if this matter went to trial?

17

MS. CORPORON:

18

THE COURT:

I do, Your Honor.

Have you gone over the plea agreement

19

with your client and explained the rights she will give up by

20

entering this plea?

21
22

, MS. CORPORON:
THE COURT:

I have.

\

And do you believe that your client

23

understands the contents of the plea agreement, the plea .

24

statement, and the constitutional rights which are waived as

25

a result of this guilty plea?
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1

MS. CORPORON:

Yes, Your Honor.

Let me again state

2

for.the record that Mr. Williams is not present today, but

3

Mr. Williams has also reviewed the evidence in this' case •'

4

exhaustively and has gone through the evidence with myself

5

and with the defendant.

6

advance of plea.

7

whole plea agreement with the defendant prior to today T s

8

hearing.

9

fully in all of those things you just asked me about up until

10

today's hearing.. I believe he would answer the questions you.

11

just asked me the same as I've answered them.

12

He has reviewed the .statement in

He has also reviewed the concept of this

Though he cannot be here now, he's participated

THE COURT:
(BY THE COURT)

Thank you for that statement.

13

Q.

Ms. Rhinehart, I want to explain to you

14

certain rights that you have in this matter.

15

out whether you understand those rights.

16

likely repeated in the statement itself, but I'm going to

17

review those with you now as part of our discussion.

I want to find

Again, these are

Please

.18. listen carefully to what I tell you and to my questions and
19

be sure to let me know, if there's anything you do' not

20

understand.

21

do so either here or in private.

22

And if you need to talk to your attorney you may

One, you have the right to plead not guilty in this'

23

matter and to maintain that plea of not guilty.

And you have

24

the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial and

25

unbiased jury.

Do you understand this?
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

Two, although you have the right to be tried by a jury,

3

you may also have a judge decide your case instead of a jury

4

if the prosecution and the judge agreed to that.

5

judge were to decide your case, the judge would also have to

6

be impartial and unbiased.. Do you understand that?

7

A.

Yes.

8

Q.

Three, do you understand that if you have a trial you

9

have the right to be represented by an attorney, actually two

If the

10

attorneys in this case.

And if you could not afford the

11

attorneys they would be appointed to represent you, as ITve

12. already done, at no cost to you.

Do you understand that?

13

A.

Yes.

14

Q.

Four, it is my understanding that you have not waived

15

your right to counsel and your attorneys continue to be Ms.

16

Corporon and Mr. Williams.

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q-.

Five, if you do not plead guilty, you are presumed to be

19

innocent until the state proves that you are guilty of

20

aggravated murder.

21

against you, you need only plead not guilty and your case

22

will go to trial as scheduled.

23

A.

Yes.

24

Q.

Do you understand that if a trial were to be held, the

25

state would have the burden of overcoming the presumption of

Is that true?

If you choose to fight this charge

Do you understand that?

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 17
1

innocence and you would have no obligation to prove your

2

innocence because you are presumed to be innocent?

3

understand that?

4 A.

You

Yes.

5

Q.

Seven, do you understand that if a trial was held the

6

state would have to prove each of the elements of the offense

7

of aggravated murder beyond a reasonable doubt before you
could be found guilty of the offense?
A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Eight, if a trial were held before a jury the verdict

11

would have to be unanimous, meaning that each juror would

12

have to find you guilty beyond a reasonable doubt before you

13

could be convicted.

14

A.

Yes.

15

Q.

Nine, do you understand that' by pleading guilty you give

16

up the presumption of innocence' and you will be admitting to.

17

the crime of aggravated murder?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Ten, you have an absolute right to remain silent.

20

cannot be compelled to incriminate yourself or provide

21

evidence against you.

22

statement which would tend to connect you.with the commission

23

of the crime.

24

right -to remain silent and you cannot be made to incriminate

25

yourself?

Do you understand that?

You

An incriminating statement is a

Do you understand that you have an absolute
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A.

Yes.

Q.

Eleven, in addition, if you choose to remain silent your

silence cannot be. used against you at trial and the jurors
would be told that they cannot hold your decision not to
testify against you.

Do you understand this?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Twelve, do you understand that a plea of guilty is an

admission of all of the facts which are necessary to
9. establish your guilt at trial?
10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Thirteen, because a plea of guilty admits all the facts

12

necessary to establish guilt, it is an incriminating

13

statement.

14

guilty you give up your right to remain silent?

15

A.

Yes.

16

Q.

Fourteen, although you have the right to remain silent,

17

if you were to have a trial you would have the right to

18

testify in your own behalf if you wished to do so.

19

understand that right?

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Fifteen, if you were to have a trial you would have the

22

right to confront and cross-examine any witness which may

23

confront you at trial.

24

be able to ask each witness questions while the witness is in

25

open court and in your presence and under oath.

Do you understand that by entering a plea of

Do you

This means that your attorneys would

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Do you

/^o

Page 19
1

understand you have that right?

2

A.

Yes.

3

Q.

Sixteen, you also have the right to present evidence and

4

to compel witnesses to appear in court to testify for you.

5

This means that you'd be entitled to obtain subpoenas

6

requiring the attendance and the testimony of those

7

witnesses.

8

witnesses to appear the state would pay those costs.

9

understand that you have that right? .

And that if you could not afford to pay the
Do you

10

A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Seventeen, do you understand that a plea of guilty

12

establishes your guilt and permits sentencing to go forward

13

without first going through the guilt and innocence phase of

14

the trial?

15

A.

Yes

16

Q.

Eighteen, if a judge or a jury were to find you guilty,

17

you would have the right to appeal your conviction'to the

18

Utah Supreme Court..

19

an attorney to assist you in preparing your appeal.

20

you could not afford the costs of an appeal the state would

21

pay the cost for you.

22

guilty you admit your own guilt.

23

in court, you cannot contest your own statement of guilt on

24

appeal.

25

A.

. . ' " . . - • '

In addition, you would have the right to
And if

However, when you enter a plea of
Having admitted your guilt

Do you understand that?

Yes.
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1

Q.

Nineteen, do you understand that by entering a plea of

2

guilty you give up all of the rights we just discussed, as

3

well as those rights set forth in the plea statement?

4

A.

Yes.

5

Q.

Ms. Rhinehart, by pleading guilty to aggravated murder,

6

further proceedings must be held to address the issue of what

7

sentence you should receive.

8

penalty phase of the trial, is an adversarial proceeding and

9

many of the aforementioned rights we discussed, the right to

The sentencing hearing, or

10

counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to testify,

11

the right to call witnesses in your behalf, the right to

12

cross-examine, are rights which apply to a sentencing .

13

hearing.

14

an unsworn statement concerning punishment that is not .

15

subject to cross-examination.

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

In light of your plea .agreement with the state, the death

18

penalty will not be a sentencing option.

19

penalties you face are, one, life in prison without parole;

20

or, two, an indeterminate prison term of not less than 20

21

years and which may be for life.

22

You also have the right, if you so choose, to make

Do you understand that right?

" • - . . -

This means that the

At the sentencing hearing both aggravating and mitigating

23

evidence will be presented relating ~o.the nature and

24

circumstances of your crime, your character, background,

25

history, mental and physical condition, and the impact of
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1

your crime upon the victim's family.

The state will'

2

introduce the aggravating evidence, which is evidence to show

3

that a sentence of life in prison without parole is the

4

appropriate penalty in your case.

5

will have the right to introduce mitigating evidence, which

6

is evidence tending to show that a sentence of life in prison

7

without parole should not be imposed.

8

that?

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Under the laws of the state of Utah, a sentence of life

11

in prison without parole can only be imposed if, after

12

considering all of the aggravating and mitigating evidence

13

presented, the court concludes that a sentence of life in

14

prison without parole is appropriate.

15

establishing that a sentence of life without parole is always

16

upon the state.

17

A.

Yes.

18

Q.

Ms. Rhinehart, in addition to facing the aforementioned

19

penalty you may also be ordered to make restitution to any

20

victims of the crime.

21

A.

Yes. .

22

Q.

After you plead guilty, if you later desire to withdraw

23

your plea of guilty you must file a written motion to

24

withdraw your plea before sentence is announced.

25

only be allowed to withdraw your plea with permission of the

You and your attorneys

Do you understand

The burden of

Do you understand that?

Do you understand that?
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1
. 2
3

court and by showing that your plea was not knowingly and
voluntarily made.
A.

4 I Q.
. 5
6

Do you understand that? '

Yes.
Up to this point is there anything that you do not

understand about this proceeding or about the plea in this
case?

•7

A.

No.

8

Q.

Is there anything you would like to ask me or your

9

attorney before I accept your plea?

10

A.

No.

11

THE COURT:

Now, ordinarily I ask the prosecutor to

12

tell me what happened in this case.. I understand that those

13

facts are set forth in the statement, Mr. Wyatt, is that

14

correct?

15

MR. WYATT:
(BY THE COURT)

That's correct.

16

Q.

When I read that I want you to listen

17

very carefully because I'm going to ask you everything about

18

those facts and If in fact they are true.

19

anything in that statement relative to the facts of this case

20

which you do not believe .is true, I want you to tell me.

21

you understand that?

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Ms. Rhin.ehart, do you feel that it is in your best

24

interest to enter a plea of guilty in this-case rather than

25

going to trial?

If there's
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1

A.

Yes.

2

Q.

You have previously entered a plea of not guilty to the

3

offense of aggravated murder.

4

withdraw that plea of not guilty?

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

What plea do you intend to enter to the charge of

•7

At this point do you wish to

aggravated murder, capital homicide, at this point?

8

A..

Guilty.

9

Q.

Ms. Rhinehart, after I review the plea statement with

10

you, we're going to set a sentencing date, assuming you enter

11 I a plea at that time.

Ordinarily the penalty phase in a

12

capital trial is conducted before a jury, unless a request is

13

made by the defendant to waive the jury and have the court

14

determine the appropriate penalty.

15

made, which I understand it is made at this point in time, is

16

that correct?

17

MS. CORPORON:

Yes, Your Honor.

18

Q.

19

consent and finally the court must grant its approval.

20

my understanding that you wish to waive the jury for

21

sentencing and request your sentencing hearing be conducted

22

before the court.

23

A.

24
25

(BY THE COURT)

If such a request is .

The prosecution must also give its
It is

Is that correct?

Yes .
THE COURT:

M r , Wyatt, is it the state's intent to

consent to have the sentencing proceed in this case conducted
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1

before the court only?

2

MR. WYATT:

Yes .

3

THE COURT:

And, Ms. Corporon, that's your intent

• 4

likewise?

5

MS, CORPORON:

6

Q.

7

sentencing statement, do you. have a copy of that before you,

8

Ms. Rhinehart?

9

A.

Yes,

10

Q.

I'm going to review this in its entirety with you.' It

11

starts off by indicating that you hereby certify that you've

12

been advised of and understand the facts and your rights as

13

contained herein; and that you have had the assistance of

14

counsel in reviewing and understanding this form.

15

(BY THE COURT)

Yes.

Now, directing your attention to the

Beginning with paragraph number one, the nature of the

16

charge against me to which I have agreed to plead guilty is

17

aggravated murder, a capital felony, in violation of

18

76-5-202(1)(f),1953 as amended.

19

to discuss the nature of the charge with my attorneys.

20

understand the charge and the elements that the government is

21

required to prove.

22

A.

Yes.

23

Q.

Paragraph two, I understand that the elements of the

24

charge of aggravated murder are that I intentionally and

25

knowingly caused the death of Michael Boudrero for the

I have had the opportunity
I

Do you understand that, is that true?
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1

purpose of pecuniary gain.

I understand that Utah law

2

provides that every person acting with the mental state

3

required for the commission of an offense who directly

4

commits the offense, who solicits, requests, commands,

5

encourages or intentionally aids another person to engage in

6

conduct which constitutes an offense shall be criminally

7

liable as a party for such conduct.

8

that a plea of guilty is an admission to all of these

9

elements.

I further understand

Ms. Rhinehart, is- that true?

10 A.

Yes.

11

Q.

Three., I know that the maximum possible penalty provided

12

for by law for a conviction of aggravated murder, under the-.

13

terms of this plea, is imprisonment for life without

14

possibility of parole and a fine or-both.

15

minimum possible sentence under this plea is an indeterminate

•16

I know that the

prison term of not less than 20 years and which may be for

17

life.

18

consecutive to the sentence I'm currently serving.

19 A.

I further understand that the sentence can be

Yes.

20

THE COURT:

The last sentence there, Mr. Wyatt, I

21

further understand that this sentence can be consecutive to

22

the sentence I'm currently serving, is there a sentence she's

23

currently serving?.

24
25

MS. CORPORON:
Honor.

She's currently on probation, Your

There's a sentence imposed or may be.

I think that's
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1

a reference to that possibility.

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3

MR. WYATT:

That was the burglary trial, Your Honor.

4

THE COURT:

That's right. . I'm sorry.

5

we concluded that.

We were going to originally reserve it.

6 I We did conclude it.
(BY THE COURT)

I forgot that

Thank you.

7

Q.

Four, I know that I can be represented by

8

an attorney at every stage of this proceeding.

9

I cannot afford an attorney'one will be appointed to

And I know if

10

represent me.

I am in fact being represented by Ms. Mary C.

11

Corporon and Scott Williams.

12

A.

Yes..

13

Q.

Five, I know that I have the right to plead not guilty.

14

I know that I have entered a plea of not guilty and I can'

15

continue to persist in that plea. . Is that true? .

16

A.

Yes.

17

Q.

Six, I know I have the right to a speedy public trial by

18

an impartial jury.

19

scheduled beginning April 7, 2005.

20

stand trial by a jury, A, I have the right to the presumption

21

of innocence. . 3, I have the right to the assistance of two

22

qualified counsel at every stage of the.proceedings.

23

have the.right to see and observe the witnesses who testify

24

against me.

25

court, all witnesses who testify against me.

Is thai: true?.

In fact,: I presently have a jury trial
I know that if I were to

C, I

D, my attorneys can cross-examine, in open
E, I can call

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

/¥8

Page 27
1

such witnesses as I desire and I can obtain subpoenas to

2

require, the attendance and testimony of these witnesses.

3

I cannot afford to pay the witness and the mileage fees of

4

those witnesses, the government will pay them for me.

5

If

F, I cannot be forced to incriminate myself and I do not

6

have to testify at my trial.

7

decision made, in consultation with my attorneys.

8

not testify the jury will be told that no inference adverse

9

to me may be drawn from my failure to testify.

10

Whether or not I testify is my
G, if I do

H, the government must prove each and every element of

11

the offense' charged against me beyond a reasonable doubt.

12

it requires a unanimous verdict of a' jury of 12 to convict

13

me.

14

cannot afford to appeal the government will pay the costs of

15

appeal, including the services of two appointed counsel.

16

J, if I were to be convicted I can appeal.

I,

And if I

I am freely, voluntarily and knowingly waiving all of the

17

foregoing rights.

Is that true, Ms. Rhinehart?

18

A.

Yes.

19

Q.

Seven, I know that a plea —

20

under a plea of guilty there will not be a trial of any kind.

21

I will not have a jury hearing of any kind.

22

will be imposed by the.assigned judge herein.

23

that to be true?

24

A.

Yes.

25

Q.

Eight, I understand that by pleading guilty there will be

excuse me.

I know that

The sentence
You understand
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1

no appellate review of any lawful sentence imposed.

2

may appeal the sentence imposed under this plea of guilty

3 ] only in the following circumstances.

I know I

A, if the sentence was

4

imposed in violation of the law.

5

result of.an incorrect application of sentencing law.

6

if the sentence is greater than the law allows as to fine or

7

imprisonment; or is greater than the sentence specified in

8

this agreement.

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Number nine, I represent that the following facts

11

regarding the charge I am pleading guilty to are true and

12

correct, or that I do not dispute the facts referenced below

13

for which I do not have personal knowledge.

14

I became acquainted with my co-defendant, Mr. Craig Nicholls.

15

B, in 2003 I made statements to Mr. Nicolls which he

16

understood and interpreted as a request on my part for him to

17

murder my former husband, Michael Boudrero.

18

Boudrero was murdered by shooting in Cache County, Utah,' in

19 j July of 2003.

B, if the sentence was a
Or, C,

Do you understand that to be true?

A, in early 2003

C, Michael

D, I was not present at the time of the

20

shooting of Michael Boudrero, but I am informed and believe, •

21

by reason of my prior conversations with Mr. Nicholls and by

22

reason of Mr. Nicholls's subsequent statements, that he is

23

the person.who shot Michael Boudrero and that Mr. Nicholls

24

did so at my request and instigation.

25

of Michael Boudrero to occur by the following circumstances.

I intended the death
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1

MR. WYATT:

Excuse me.. Foregoing circumstances.

2

THE COURT:

I'm sorry.

Thank you.

E, I was

3

therefore a party accomplice to the murder of Michael

4

Boudrero. ' F, I made efforts to obtain a life insurance

5

policy or policies on the life of Michael Boudrero and

6

intended that I may -- excuse me.

7

would receive the life insurance benefits and/or Social

8

Security benefits upon the death of Michael Boudrero.

9

I or my minor children

Ms. Rhinehart, is all of that true?

10

A. . Yes.

11

Q.

Your answer is yes?

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.

Number 10, the only terms and conditions contained in

14

this plea agreement between me and the state are as follows.

15 .A, I will plead guilty to count one of the information,
16

aggravated murder.

B, the state agrees to dismiss the

17

remaining counts in the information. ' C, the state agrees

18

that it will not seek, and specifically is withdrawing its

19 I request, to impose a death penalty.- The court will not
20

impose a death penalty.

D, pursuant to Utah law, I agree I

21

will serve a period of incarceration for this offense of

22

either life without the possibility of parole; or an

23

indeterminate prison term of not less than 20 years and which

24

may be for life, to be determined by the- assigned judge

25

herein at an evidentiary sentencing hearing.

I understand
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1

that at this hearing I may produce testimony and evidence in

2

support of life, and that the state will produce testimony

3

and evidence in support of a sentence of life without

4

possibility of parole.

5

A.

Yes.

6

Q.

Number 11, I have the right to ask the court any

7

questions I wish to ask concerning my rights and about these

8

proceedings and the plea.

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

Do you have any questions you want to ask at this point?

11

A.

No.

12

Q.

12, I make the following representations to the court.

13

A, I'm 46 years of age.

14

read and understand the English language.

15

promises of any sort have been made to me to. induce or

16

persuade me to enter this plea, other than the

17

representations of the plea agreement and the provisions

18

contained herein.

19

probation or any other form of special leniency because of my

20

plea.

21

lawyers as much as I wish too.

22

lawyers, Mary Corporon and Scott Williams.

23

enter this plea was made after'full and careful thought,• with

24

the advice of counsel, and a full understanding of my

25

constitutional, trial,, and appeal rights, with a full •

Is that true?

Do you understand that to be true?

•

My education is high school.

I can

B, no threats or

C, no one has told me I will receive

D, ITve discussed this case and the plea with my
E, I'm satisfied with my
F, my decision to
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1

understanding of the evidence the state would adduce at trial

2

in the case, and with a full understanding of the

3

consequences of this plea.

4

any drugs, medications or intoxicants when the decision to

5

enter this plea was made and I am not now under the influence

6

of any drugs, medications•or intoxicants.

7

I was not under the influence of

Is that true with the exception of the medication you

8

earlier indicated, Ms. Rhinehart?.

9

A.

Yes.

10

Q.

And it's also true that you believe that the medication

11

which you identified, does not adversely affect your ability

12

to understand these proceedings, is that true?

13

A.

1,4 Q.

Yes.
Thirteen, I understand that I have- the right to file a

15

motion to withdraw this plea of guilty only if made prior to

.16

sentence being imposed.

17

automatically be granted and will be granted only upon leave

18

of the court and a showing that my plea of guilty was not

19

maid knowingly and voluntarily.

20

A.

Yes.

21

Q.

Fourteen, I have no mental reservations concerning this

22

plea.

23

A.

24
25

Such a motion, if made, will not

Is that.true?

Is that also true?

Yes.
THE COURT:

Mr. Wyatt, are there any other questions

which you want to address to the defendant in support of a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

/S3

Page 32
1

finding by this court that the plea is made knowingly,

2

voluntarily, intentionally and intelligently?

3
4

MR. WYATT:

We have no further questions.

Thank

you.

5

THE COURT: . Ms. Corporon, is there.any question

6

which you think has not been addressed or any issue which you

7

think needs to be addressed before the court accepts her

8

plea?

9

MS. CORPORON:

10

THE COURT:

No, Your Honor.

I will ask you each, Mr. Wyatt and Ms.

11

Corporon, to. first countersign the plea agreement as it.has

12

been given to me.

13
14

MS. CORPORON:

Your Honor.

I think first the

defendant should probably sign the document. •

15

THE COURT:

That's fine.

I just want a

16

certification from each of you that this plea, as far as you

17

know, is being made knowingly and voluntarily.

18

Q.

19

statement, and by doing so I instruct you that you do so with

20

a' full understanding of its contents, the import of the

21

contents of the same, and that this is made knowingly and

22

freely and voluntarily by you, is. that true?

23

A.

(BY THE COURT)

Ms. Rhinehart, I'll ask you to sign the

Yes.

24

THE COURT:

All right.

25

MS. CORPORON:

The record should reflect that Ms.
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1

Rhinehart has just executed the statement in advance of plea

2

in open court just now before Your Honor.

3

the certificate as defense counsel.

4
5

THE COURT:

I've also signed

The copy which you have, I assume, is an

exact copy from which I've been reading?

6

. MS. CORPORON:

Yes, Your Honor, I believe

7

MR. WYATT:

8

executed the same document.

9

THE COURT:

so.

May the record reflect that I've just

The record will reflect that in open

10

court Tamra Rhinehart singed, the document. . It has been

11

countersigned by Mary Corporon.

12

Williams is not signed since he's not present here today in

13

court.

14

The signature.line for Mr.

, To the charge, then, Ms. Rhinehart, of aggravated murder,

15

criminal homicide, a capital offense, in violation of

16

76-5-202. of the Utah Code, sub one, sub F, as I've read and

17

we have discussed that this morning regarding the death of

18

Mr. Michael Boudrero, how do you plead?

19

MS. RHINEHART:

20

THE COURT:

Guilty.

Based upon the plea statement and the'

21

court's discussion and colloquy with the defendant, and

22

observation of Ms. Rhinehart, this court finds that Ms.

23

Rhinehart has entered a plea of guilty knowingly and

24

voluntarily, with full knowledge of her rights.

25

also finds that Ms. Rhinehart understands the nature and
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1

elements of. the offense to which she's pleaded and the

2

relationship between the facts of this case and the elements

3

of the offense charged.

4

state has proffered evidence it believes is sufficient to

5

form a factual basis for the plea of guilty.

6

Finally, this court finds that the

Based upon such the court, knowing those things, accepts

7

the defendant's plea of guilty as charged in count one of the

8

third amended information.

9

Ms. Rhinehart, it is necessary at'this point for the

10

court to set a date for a sentencing hearing.

Ordinarily the

11

penalty phase in a capital case is. conducted before a jury,

12

as we discussed earlier.

13

you have waived the right to a jury.

14

will be conducted by this' court alone.

That jury will not be here because.
The sentencing phase

15

Mr. Wyatt, you specifically, on behalf of the state,

16

consent to the sentencing phase being conducted by the court

17

without a jury?

18

MR. WYATT:

That's correct.

19

THE COURT:

Ms. Corporon, you likewise consent?

20

' MS. CORPORON:

21

THE COURT:

Yes, Your Honor.

The court will grant its approval that

22

the sentencing of in this case will be conducted before the

23

court.

24

Procedure,' the matter needs to be set for sentencing in not

25

less than two nor more than 45 days, unless the . defendant

Pursuant to Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
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1

agrees to waive the time.

2

required?

3

MR. WYATT:

4

reserve three hours for us.

5

How much hearing time will be

The state, would request that the court

MS. CORPORON:

I think, Your Honor, we need more

6

time.

7

We may not need a couple of days, but I ask that we. reserve a

8

couple of days.

9

There is some material that we would need to present.

THE COURT:

Before I set that date, I think it would

10

be advisable for this .court to receive from Adult Probation

11

and Parole- a presentence report.

12

MS. CORPORON:

Your Honor, if I could respond to

13

that, as the court is well aware from what the court has

14

executed in terms of authorizing orders for defense experts

15

in this case, we've had a mitigation expert and several .

16

investigators working on this matter.

17

has been working since the summer of 2003, actually, late

18

summer of 2003., and has substantial material.

19

That mitigation expert

I would suggest, Your Honor, that what we would have to

20

present would be much more exhaustive regarding this

21

defendant, her history,•her life circumstances, than what I

22

have ever seen in. a standard felony presentence

23

investigation.

24

would begin to run into questions of whether, in order to

25

enable the pretrial officer to do his or her job, whether we

That it would be surplusage.

I think we
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1

ought to turn that material, which is extremely voluminous,

2

over to them.

I'd suggest that in this particular case,

3 J under these unique circumstances, a presentence report is
4

surplusage.

5

THE COURT:

There's a procedural purpose for a.

6

presentence report having to do with the procedures and

7

operating —

8

Corrections.

9

invited Ms. Hoxey to be here from the Department of

10
11

the operating procedures of the Department of
Mr. Wyatt, I'll ask you to respond.

I've also

Corrections relative to this issue.
I agree, Ms. Corporon, I don't want to- have the

12

Department of Corrections simply duplicate and extend their

13

efforts by way of surplusage.

14

be some things that, without duplicating everything your

15

mitigating investigator has already done, may be beneficial

16

to the court.

17

MR. WYATT:

On the other hand, there may

Your Honor, the state concurs.

We would

18- concur with the court's indication that you would like a
19

presentence report.-' We would appreciate 'a presentence report

20

as well.

21

sentence is as significant as.it is, we ought to do

22

everything we can to get as much information to the court.

23

I think that in a case like this, where the

THE COURT:

Ms. Hoxey, if I may ask you to respond

24

to this, in deference to Ms. Corporon's concern relative to

25

surplusage and duplication of effort, I assume, by way of
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1

policy, that the Department of Corrections is in a position

2

to prepare such a report?

3

MS. HOXEY:

Yes.

4

THE COURT:

Can you do so in consultation with Ms.

5

Corporon so that in fact your efforts can be minimized but

6

still -fulfill your procedural requirements?

7

MS. HOXEY:

I feel like we can meet all the

8

requirements and also get the information to make sure that

9

you have all the information available.

10

'MS. CORPORON:

I guess that's one of the problems

11

that I have, Your Honor.

12

product.

13

It's confidential information.
THE COURT:

14

What I have right now is work
I wish to be --

I'm not asking to you do that.

• MS. CORPORON:

I wish to be able to organize that

15

and present it to the court in an evidentiary hearing in a

16

way most beneficial to my client.

17

to someone isn't what I'm seeking to do.

18

THE COURT:

To just open everything up

I'm going to ask Ms. Hoxey to be

19

sensitive to that and prepare what she can.

If you have an

20

objection to it because it is work product or because you

.21

think it would be better presented in the hearing, I'll defer

22

to that.

23

:

•
MS. CORPORON:

Thank you, Your Honor.

At the time

24

of the hearing I'm going to be asking to append a mitigation

25

report and whatever findings this court makes to the
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1

presentence report, because I do understand that a

2

presentence report goes into the prison and determines, among

3

other things, custodial status and action of the Board, if

4

any.

5

THE COURT:

That's right.

I would invite that.

Ms..

6

Hoxey, to that extent, tailoring your usual procedures with

7

those concerns in mind I'm going to ask you to prepare a

8

report.

9
10

Now, then, let's talk about a time frame.
time, obviously --

11
12

MS. CORPORON:

May Ms. Rhinehart be seated, Your

Honor?

13
14

We have some

THE COURT:

Yes, certainly.

We have some time,

obviously, already set aside between the 7th of April and the

15 J 4th of May.

That may be too soon.

I'm seeking the advice of

16

counsel about that.

17

that Ms. Corporon already has her material gathered?

18

I would like to put it there.

MS. CORPORON:

I assume

My client has just asked if she could

19

be excused from the courtroom.

20

is scheduled a hearing at this point it's not a critical

21

stage of the proceedings.

22

THE COURT:

23

45 days.

24

days.

25

I think since all we're doing

It only is if we schedule it outside the-

It is my intent to try and do it within; the 45

Otherwise it would require her agreement.
MS. CORPORON:

I believe she would at this time
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1

agree to any scheduling that works with her counsel and with

2

the court in this matter.

3

the 45 days if thatfs what is necessary for us to be able to

4

present our case the way that we hope to be able to do.

5

the court could take that waiver from her now, she's asked, if

6

she could be excused.

7

THE COURT:

8

waiver?

9

Corporon?

I believe she would agree to waive

If

Ms. Rhinehart, is that in fact your

Do. you agree with the statement just made by Ms.

10

MS. RHINEHART:

11

THE COURT:

12

•' MS. CORPORON:

Yes.

All right. . You may be excused,-, then.
Thank you, Your Honor.

As to the

13

timing on this, we have several witnesses that we would want

14

to call for sentencing.

15

individuals that they would need to be necessary -- need to

16

be available for a possible sentencing phase and told them to

17

be available toward the end of April or the first two weeks

18

of May.

19

case.

20

particular has three trials in which he T s supposed to testify

21

in the first three weeks of April.

22
23
24
25

We had originally told those

That's when they all cleared to do the Rhinehart
A couple of them have made other plans.

THE COURT:

One in

Let me suggest, then, the 3rd and 4th of

May.
MS. CORPORON:

Or would the 25th and 26th of April

or the 28th and 29th be a possibility?
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1

THE COURT:

2

MS. CORPORON:

3

Those also work for everybody.

THE COURT:

Any preference for you, Mr. Wyatt? .

4

MR. WYATT:

The 28th and 29th are fine with us.

5

MS. CORPORON:

6

•

Certainly.

It works well for me.

I believe it

also works for the people we would have to have here.

7

THE COURT:

Ms. Hoxey, thatTs a little bit shorter

8

than usual.

We're imposing upon you.

9

somewhat abbreviated form likewise.

10

with the Department of Corrections?

But this may be a
Is that satisfactory

11

MS. HOXEY:

Yes.

12

THE COURT:

9:00, then, on the 28th of April.

13

go that day and the next day.

14

MR. WYATT:

Is that within the 45 days?

15

THE COURT:

It is.

16

Mr. Wyatt, anything further from

the state?

17

MR. WYATT:

No, Your Honor.

18

THE COURT:

Anything further from the defense?

19

MS. CORPORON:

20

THE COURT:

21
22

We'll

Thank you.

No, Your Honor.

Thank you, counsel.

Thank you.
Court will be in

recess.
(Concluded at 11:55 a.m.)

23
24
25
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C E R T I F I C A T E

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the change of plea hearing was
reported and transcribed by me, Rodney M. Felshaw, a
Certified Court Reporter in and for the State of Utah'.
That a full, true and correct transcription of the
hearing, to the best of my ability, is set forth in the
pages numbered 2 to 40, inclusive.I further certify that the original transcript was
filed with the Court Clerk, First District Court, Cache
County, Logan, Utah.
Dated this 21st day of June, 2005.

Rodney" MTFelshaw7"cTsTRT7"RTpTR"
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FIRST DISTRICT - CACHE
CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
APPEALED: CASE #20050635
STATE OF UTAH vs. TAMRA RHINEHART
CASE NUMBER 031100633 State Felony

CHARGES
Charge 1 - 76-5-202 - AGGRAVATED MURDER Capital (amended) to
Capital
Offense Date: July 08, 2003
Plea: March 18, 2005 Guilty
Disposition: March 18, 2005 Guilty

CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE
GORDON J LOW
PARTIES
Plaintiff- STATE OF UTAH
Represented by: N GEORGE DAINES
Represented by: DONALD G LINTON
Represented by: SCOTT L WYATT
Defendant - TAMRA RHINEHART
Represented by: ELIZABETH HUNT
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Defendant Name: TAMRA RHINEHART
Date of Birth: September 05, 1958
Law Enforcement Agency: {NORTH LOGAN POLICE}
Prosecuting Agency: CACHE COUNTY
ACCOUNT SUMMARY
TOTAL REVENUE Amount Due:
Amount Paid:
5,339.50
Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00

5,339.50

REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: COPY FEE
Amount Due:
1.00
Amount Paid:
1.00
Amount Credit:
0.00
Balance:
0.00
REVENUE DETAIL - TYPE: REPORTER FEES
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CASE NUMBER 031100633 State Felony

04-25-05 Filed: AP&P PSI w/attachments - confidential file
04-27-05 Filed order: Request For Still Photography In Courtroom approved
Judge GORDON J LOW
Signed April 27, 2005
04-28-05 Notice - Final Exhibit List
04-28-05 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCING
Judge: GORDON J. LOW
PRESENT
Clerk: lindald
Reporter: FELSHAW, ROD
Prosecutor: WYATT, SCOTT L
, Defendant
Defendant's Attorney(s): CORPORON, MARY C

V

Tape Count: 10:29 AM
HEARING
COUNT: 10:29 AM
Court in session following prior in chambers conference with
counsel. Arty's Wyatt & Linton present for the State. Atty's
Corporon & Williams present for the defense. Court will be in
recess to review procedure with counsel in chambers.
TIME: 11:39 AM Court again in session. Sentencing will proceed
by oral victim statements to the Court.
TIME: 12:10 PM Court in lunch recess to reconvene at 1:00 PM.
TIME: 1:27 PM Court again in session. Atty Wyatt offers State's
Exhibits 1 & 2. Court receives Exhibits 1 & 2.
TIME: 1:28 PM Atty Corporon states another victim, Shea Croshaw
desires to offer a statement. Court receives statement.
TIME: 1:34 PM Atty Wyatt cross examines victim Shea Croshaw &
re-direct follows. Victim was not put under oath.
TIME: 1:37 PM Atty Williams calls Witness Steven Clegg. Witness
Clegg sworn & direct examination conducted.
TIME: 1:46 PM Witness Clegg cross examined.
TIME: 1:47 PM Witness Clegg steps down. Atty Williams calls
Witness Dayna Fair, Witness Fair sworn & direct examined.
TIME: 1:54 PM Witness Fair steps down. Atty Corporon proffers
testimony of Leann Careloa, Clearfield Elementary School Teacher &
Tamra Tingey, Clearfield Elementary School Principal. Proffered
testimony received by Court.
TIME: 1:59 PM Defense Exhibit 1, 2 & 3 offered & received as
sealed documents. Defendant advised of right of allocution.
Defendant waives the right of allocution.
TIME: 2:05 PM State calls rebuttal Witness Dr Vickie Gregory who
is sworn & direct examined.
TIME: 2:27 PM Dr Gregory steps down. No further testimony by
either side.

I
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CASE NUMBER 031100633 State Felony

TIME: 2:28 PM Atty Wyatt presents closing argument.
TIME: 2:57 PM Atty Corporon offers closing argument.
TIME: 3:24 PM Atty Wyatt presents rebuttal argument.
TIME: 3:36 PM Atty Corporon offers Defense Exhibit 4. Court
receives Exhibit 4. Court takes a brief recess.
TIME: 4:07 PM Court again in session. Judge Low addresses the
Court and sentences the Defendant. Defendant is ordered to serve a
life sentence in the Utah State Prison without the possibility of
parole.
TIME: 4:39 PM Prison sentence ordered in case 031101017 will run
concurrent with this case. State will prepare the Sentence,
Judgment & Commitment. Court grants State's motion to withdraw
State's Exhibits 1 & 2 which are returned to State's custody.
TIME: 4:40 PM Court in recess.
05-05-05 Filed: Transcript Request/Billing Statement (Don Linton)
05-05-05 Filed: Subpoena (Tamra Tingey)
05-05-05 Filed: Subpoena ( Leann Carreola)
05-05-05 Note: SENTENCING minutes modified.
05-09-05 Filed: Stricken/Unsigned Order Authorizing Withdrawal Of
Counsel And Order To Appoint New Counsel
05-09-05 Filed: Motion For Leave To Withdraw As Counsel For Purposes Of
Appeal
05-09-05 Filed: Transcript Of Judge's Ruling at Sentencing 4/28/05
05-17-05 Filed: Notice Of Appeal
05-17-05 Filed: Defendant's Objections To Presentence Report And Motion
To Redact Objectionable Portions
05-24-05 Fee Account created
Total Due:
70.00
05-24-05 REPORTER FEES
Payment Received:
70.00
Note: REPORTER FEES, Mail Payment;
05-27-05 Filed: Faxed Letter Requesting Transcript of Change Of Plea
Hearing 4/28/05 by Atty Williams
05-31-05 Filed: Certification In Re: Transcript with attached letter
dated 5/24/05
06-07-05 Filed: Letter from Atty Scott Williams requesting withdrawal
from consideration the Motion For Leave to Withdraw as Counsel
06-09-05 Filed: Letter from Law Clerk Michael Christiansen to Atty Scott
Wyatt regarding Motion for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel for
Purposes of Appeal
06-10-05 Filed: Docketing Statement
06-15-05 Minute Entry - Minutes tor TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
Judge: GORDON J. LOW
PRESENT
Clerk: lindaid
TELEPHONE CONFERENCE
Prosecutor: LINTON, DONALD G
Defendant not present
Defendant's Attorney(s): WILLIAMS, SCOTT C

Printed: 02/20/12 09:45:45
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Bridgerland's Daily Newspaper

Rhinehart pleads guilt]

ogan plumber's
x-wife sidesteps
eath penalty with
iiirder admission
' Tyler Riggs
iff writer

Tamra Rhinehart will be spared the
ath penalty after she pleaded guilty to
irdering her ex-husband in 1st District
>urt on Friday.
Rhinehart, 46, was expected to stand
al next month in the July 2003 murder
Logan plumber Michael Boudrero,
t she reversed her plea of not guilty
d will be sentenced for the capital
fense April 28.
Boudrero's family members said they
>pe Rhinehart gets the same sentence
r boyfriend and accomplice, Craig

Local reaction — A3
uncan Nicholls, got after he pleaded
lilty to fatally shooting Boudrero, at
tunehart's behest, in a North Logan
)me: life without parole.
"(We want her to get) life in jail withit any possibility of parole,' , said Marline Folkman, Boudrero's sister. "I
>n't want her out. If she ever got out, I
ould fear for our lives, my husband and
her people, too."
"We just want her put away and to sufi'r for her whole life." added Michelle

photos by Eli Lucero/Herald Journal
Tamra Rhinehart, above left and in top right photo, appears in 1st District Court with her lawyer, Mary
Corporon, on Friday in Logan. Rhinehart pleaded guilty to aggravated murder for conspiring with Craig
Nicholls to kill her ex-husband, Michael
Boudrero.
bottom right
photo, Law
Cache
CountyJ.Deputy
Attorney
Digitized
by theInHoward
W. Hunter
Library,
Reuben
Clark Law
o . _ „ wwafa .~„.„, «„„„ oininnhcrt'Q n i M anrp.Rment durina court. Sentencing is scheduled for April 28.
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FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
COUNTY OF CACHE, STATE OF UTAH

MEMORANDUM DECISION

TAMRA RHINEHART,
Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 080102055

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent.

Judge: Kevin K. Allen

THE ABOVE MATTER is before the Court pursuant to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post-Conviction Relief In preparation for its decision,
the Court has reviewed the Motion and Memorandum, the Opposition, the Reply, each document
submitted before the Court, and the applicable case law and statutory provisions. In addition, oral
arguments were received on March 31, 2010. Having considered the forgoing, the Court issues
this Memorandum Decision.
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel:
Petitioner must satisfy a two-prong test in order to prevail on a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "First, the defendant
must show that counsel's performance was deficient.. . . Second, the defendant must show that
the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. "Additionally, "proof of ineffective
assistance of counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality.""
Nicholls v. State, 2009 UT 12, <|36 (Utah 2009) (quoting Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 877
(Utah 1993)).
As to the first prong, Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that her counsel's representation
"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, at 688. Although Petitioner
argues that she was coerced into making the plea by her trial counsel and that her trial counsel
1
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mislead her about the sentence she should receive, the record does not support such contentions.
Rather, the record demonstrates that Petitioner repeatedly affirmed that she had adequate
opportunity to talk with her attorneys, that she was fully satisfied with her counsel's
representation and advice received, and that she was not coerced or made promises in entering
her plea. Petitioner also fully waived her right to have Attorney Scott Williams present. In
addition, Mr. William's Affidavit acknowledges that the plea "was an appropriate resolution."
Moreover, the newspaper picture that Petitioner has submitted does not support her allegation of
coercion. Rather, the picture suggests concern and comfort by her trial counsel as Attorney Mary
Corporon's fingers are lightly around Petitioner's shoulder instead of being "firmly" pressed on
her shoulder. Therefore, the Court finds Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence that would
objectively demonstrate that her counsel's representation was unreasonable. See generally State
v. Thorup, 841 P.2d 746, 748 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
Coupled with Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the claim that her
plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered because she was mentally or emotionally
unstable. However, this claim is also refuted by the plea colloquy. The court accepted
Petitioner's plea only after specifically addressing Petitioner's use of Lexapro and her ability to
understand the proceedings and consequences of entering her plea. Also, Petitioner represented to
the Court that she did not have any mental or emotional problems or disabilities which would
interfere with her ability to understand the proceedings. As such, Petitioner has failed to show
that her plea was unknowing and involuntary or that her counsel was ineffective by failing to stop
her from entering a knowing and voluntary plea.
Additionally, the meticulous and thorough plea colloquy done by the court accepting
Petitioner's plea, overcame any alleged deficiencies in Petitioner's trial counsel's representations
regarding the rights given up and consequences of entering her plea. Based on the foregoing, the
Court finds that the allegations in the Petition are insufficient to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that Petitioner's trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness. It is reasonable for trial counsel to advise a client to accept a plea offer sparing
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them a possible death sentence. Nicholls, 2009 UT 12, ^[3.7. Therefore, Petitioner has failed to
satisfy the Strickland test.
Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel:
Petitioner argues that her appellate counsel was ineffective by failing to raise the issue of
a misplea on appeal. Petitioner argues that her plea was flawed because "[s]he was under the
influence of Lexapro, extremely emotional, and collapsed during the proceeding" and because
she was not correctly informed of her rights. (Petition, 12). However, the record of the pleahearing evidences that her plea was not flawed. The court was aware that Petitioner was taking
Lexapro. The court on more than one occasion addressed the effects Lexapro had on.Petitioner's
ability to enter a blowing and voluntary plea. In all cases, Petitioner stated that the medication
did not negatively affect her. More important, Petitioner has failed to provide any evidence that
the Lexapro impaired her ability to enter her guilty plea. Oliver v. State, 2006 UT 60, \\ 1 (Utah
2006) (holding that "[t]he critical question is whether the drugs - if they have a capacity to
impair the defendant's ability to plea - have in fact done so on this occasion").
In most instances, . , . when a mood-altering drug is given to a defendant by a
physician, it is to improve the defendant's cognitive abilities. In other words, the fact
that a defendant has undergone a medical evaluation and is receiving medication to
treat a psychological infirmity is often evidence weighing in favor of a finding that
the defendant is capable of entering a knowing and voluntary plea.
Id. at ^[14. It has also been established that a trial court need not, sua sponte, move for a
competency hearing when a defendant is '"'coherent," "respond[s] to questions appropriately,"
and "repeatedly affirm[s]" [her] choice to plead gwlty".Nicholls9 2009 UT 12,1J29 (quoting State
v. Arguelles, 2003 UT 1, f 53 (Utah 2003)). Also, Petitioner has failed to assert that the Rule 11
plea colloquy was improper as was the case in State v. Lopez, 2005 UT App. 496, ^[22 (Utah Ct.
App. 2005). (holding that the jurisdictional time limit imposed on a motion to withdraw did not
effect a court's ability to set aside a plea when the court finds that the plea was not knowingly
and voluntarily made). Rather, the plea hearing record establishes that the court determined, more
than once, that the Petitioner in fact was mentally capable of entering a plea and that such plea
Case no. 080102055
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was in fact knowingly, freely, voluntarily, and intelligently made.
As such, it was not ineffective assistance of counsel for Petitioner's appellate counsel to
"fail" to assert a "misplea" claim on direct appeal. Petitioner has failed to show that there was "a
reasonable probability that, but for [her] counsel's unreasonable failure to file a merits brief,
[s]he would have prevailed on [her] appeal." Kelly. State, 2008 UT 62, ^}25 (Utah 2008) (quoting
Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286, 120 S. Ct. 746 (2000)). Therefore, Petitioner has failed to
meet her burden under the Strickland test as to this claim.
Conclusion:
Petitioner has failed to carry her burden of proof on both of her grounds for relief raised
in her Petition. Therefore, the Motion to Dismiss is granted. Counsel for Respondent is directed
to prepare an order in conformance herewith.
.

Dated this ^ T ^ d a y of May, 2010.
BY THE COURT:

MeiT
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 080102 055 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL: DAVID M PERRY 14 W 100 N POB 364 LOGAN, UT 84321
MAIL: RYAN D TENNEY 160 E 300 S P 0 BOX 140854 SALT LAKE CITY
84114-0854
Date:

5 m 10

UT

Deputy Court Clerk

Paae 1 (last)
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